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Note
Establishing an “Injury-in-Fact” through
Valuations of Ecosystem Services: Putting It in
Terms Federal Courts Understand
Allie Jo Mitchell*
INTRODUCTION
Environmental
public
interest
organizations,
conservationists, and those seeking to vindicate nature for
human-caused damages know all too well the difficulties that lie
in seeking justice in the American court system. Environmental
harms, like air pollution, are often diffuse, making it difficult to
trace the harm back to its source or properly apportion fault.1
Causation is also difficult to establish in cases where the
environmental damage occurs years or decades later.2
Furthermore, environmental harms may injure hundreds of
thousands of people, or in the case of climate change, the entire
world.3
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1. See Adam D.K. Abelkop, Tort Law as an Environmental Policy Instrument, 92 OR. L. R. 381, 404–05 (2013) (describing the problem of the diffuse
harms on indeterminate plaintiffs that cannot ascertain the harm attributable
to any one defendant); see also id. at 407 (illustrating the problem of a diffuseorigin externality like CO2 emissions on plaintiff’s ability to establish both general and specific causation).
2. See id. at 400 (raising the issue of latent toxicological harms that are
often “removed in both time and space from the defendant’s risky activity.”).
3. See id. at 405 (highlighting three difficulties that arise from diffuseharm externalities that affect a large number of people: (1) aggregate damage
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Despite all of these difficulties, one important doctrine
works to keep environmental lawsuits out of U.S. federal courts
altogether—Article III standing. By restricting federal court
jurisdiction to only “cases or controversies,” the standing
doctrine works as a bar to plaintiffs who are unable to allege an
injury-in-fact that is causally related to the defendant’s conduct
and is redressable by a favorable decision of the court.4 To meet
this initial hurdle, different standing theories have emerged
from case law and scholarship, although each has proven to have
its own limitations and drawbacks.5
The jurisdictional limits placed on the judiciary exist to
protect the executive and legislative branch from usurpation by
the only unelected branch of government.6 Notwithstanding
these valid concerns, federal courts have a “virtually unflagging
obligation” to exercise the jurisdiction given to them7 as the
branch of government tasked with the protection of the rights
and privileges of the people.8 In contravention of this duty, the
standing doctrine has proven incredibly effective at preventing
environmental plaintiffs from obtaining their due justice in the
federal court system.9 Because of this, vindication for public
may be great but individual harm may be small; (2) high transaction costs; (3)
collective action hurdles).
4. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)
(articulating the three requirements under the standing doctrine).
5. See infra Part I.C.
6. Compare THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), at ¶ 9
(“[L]iberty can have nothing to fear from the judiciary alone, but would have
everything to fear from its union with either of the other departments . . . .”),
with Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861) (“[T]he candid
citizen must confess that if the policy of the government, upon vital questions
affecting the whole people is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme
Court . . . the people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having to that
extent practically resigned their government into the hands of that eminent
tribunal.”).
7. Colo. Water Conservation Dist. v. U.S., 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976).
8. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803) (“The government of
the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not
of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws
furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.”).
9. See Marisa A. Martin & James Landman, Standing: Who can Sue to
Protect the Environment?, 19 A.B.A. INSIGHTS (Dec. 17, 2018),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/publications/insightson-law-and-society/insights-vol—19—-issue-1/standing—who-can-sue-toprotect-the-environment-/ (“In practice, however, developing a principled basis
upon which standing can be demonstrated has proven to be extremely difficult,
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interest and collective environmental rights has shifted “to the
more steeply pitched fields of state courts or the political
process.”10
This Note proposes a new tool in the environmental
standing arsenal for plaintiffs seeking to “fight the good fight”11
on behalf of the natural world—ecosystem service valuations
(ESVs). Ecosystem services first made a splash in the late 1990s
as an attempt to illustrate and link the benefits human society
receives from the natural world.12 The applications and uses for
ecosystem services has expanded greatly since then, including
the ability to determine the monetary value ecosystem services
provide.13 By using existing models, valuation techniques, and
platforms, litigators can now more easily link environmental
harms to actual or imminent and concrete and particularized
injuries to humans to overcome the burden of establishing an
injury-in-fact.
Part I of this Note introduces the relevant background
information on the standing doctrine, ecosystem services, and
the valuation of these ecosystem services. This section will first
explain how standing requirements were judicially developed
through the Case or Controversy Clause in Article III of the
Constitution. Next, Part I will explore the difficulties
environmental plaintiffs have faced meeting these standing
requirements. This Note will use the seminal cases Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife and Sierra Club v. Morton as examples and
give an overview of three commonly proposed environmental
standing theories: (1) the traditional standing theory; (2) the
ecosystem nexus theory; and, (3) the intrinsic value of nature
especially for those cases involving environmental issues.”); see also Access to
Justice, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“The ability within a society
to use courts and other legal institutions effectively to protect one’s rights and
pursue claims. — Also termed access to the courts.”).
10. Evan Tsen Lee, Deconstitutionalizing Justiciability: The Example of
Mootness, 105 HARV. L. REV. 603, 606 (1992).
11. John Samuel Bewley Monsell, Fight the Good Fight, in HYMNS OF LOVE
AND PRAISE FOR CHURCH’S YEAR (1863).
12. See James Salzman, Valuing Ecosystem Services, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 887,
888 (1997) (“Although awareness of ecosystem services dates back to Plato, only
recently have ecologists and economists begun systematically examining the
contribution of ecosystem services to social welfare.”).
13. Cf. Paul Sutton, Can You Put a Dollar Value on Nature, WORLD ECON.
F. (Mar. 6, 2015), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/03/can-you-put-adollar-value-on-nature/ (explaining how and why attempts have been made to
put a dollar value on nature).
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theory. Part I will conclude with an overview of ecosystem
services, ESV methods, and the application of ecosystem services
and standing in the law today.
Part II considers the limitations of the three commonly
proposed environmental standing theories (traditional,
ecosystem nexus, and “intrinsic value of nature” theories). This
section will then propose the use of ESVs as a tool to meet Article
III injury-in-fact standing requirements. Part II will conclude by
applying the proposed ESV methodology to cases that failed
under each one of the commonly proposed standing theories:
traditional, ecosystem nexus, and “intrinsic value of nature.”
I.

BACKGROUND

This Part introduces the standing doctrine and ecosystem
services. Section A explores the rise of the standing doctrine and
articulates the three judicially developed elements a plaintiff
must meet to bring a lawsuit in federal court. Section B provides
a summary of landmark cases in the environmental standing
field. Section C discusses three theories advanced in scholarship
and case law to establish standing in environmental lawsuits.
Section D explains what ecosystem services are and how to value
them using ecosystem service assessments, also known as
ecosystem service valuations. Section E concludes Part I with a
discussion on the current application of ecosystem services in the
law today.
A. ARTICLE III AND THE “CASE OR CONTROVERSY” STANDING
REQUIREMENTS
The standing doctrine is employed by federal courts to
determine whether it has power, or jurisdiction, to hear the
plaintiff’s case.14 It derives from the Constitution’s limit of
federal court jurisdiction to only “cases and controversies.”15
Many courts and scholars have interpreted this restriction as a
derivative of separation of powers principles.16 As Alexander
14. See Francisco Benzoni, Environmental Standing: Who Determines the
Value of Other Life?, 18 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 347, 356 (2008) (explaining
that a federal court’s jurisdiction can be invoked when the plaintiff meets
federal standing requirements).
15. U.S. CONST. art III, § 2 (extending federal judicial power to certain
“cases” or “controversies”).
16. See Brian A. Stern, An Argument Against Imposing the Federal Case or
Controversy Requirement on State Courts, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 77, 92 (1994) (“By
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Hamilton argued in the Federalist Papers, separation of the
judiciary power from the legislative and executive powers was
necessary to prevent against the rise of a monarchy.17
In order to protect the separation of powers principles at
play in the Case or Controversy Clause, the Judiciary developed
minimum requirements that must be met for a plaintiff to bring
a lawsuit in federal court.18 This came to be known as the
standing doctrine and is considered by federal courts as
“constitutionally required and jurisdictional in nature.”19
Standing is often interpreted as a limitation on the judiciary’s
power, ensuring that federal courts do not preside over an issue
that is better suited for remedy by the legislative or executive
branch.20
The modern standing requirements were first articulated by
the Supreme Court in the 1970s in a series of cases21 and
highlighted in the seminal standing case Lujan v. Defenders of

limiting their sphere of action to cases and controversies, federal courts respect
the separation of powers by not interfering unnecessarily with the other
branches of government.”); see also Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740
(1972) (explaining that standing protects against “judicial review at the behest
of organizations or individuals who seek to do no more than vindicate their own
value preferences through the judicial process.”).
17. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), at ¶ 9 (“For I agree,
that ‘there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the
legislative and executive powers.’”) (quoting MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF LAWS
181 (1748)).
18. See Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 701 (2011) (“Article III of the
Constitution grants this court authority to adjudicate legal disputes only in the
context of ‘Cases’ or ‘Controversies.’”).
19. See Evan Tsen Lee & Josephine Mason Ellis, The Standing Doctrine’s
Dirty Little Secret, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 169, 186 (2012) (citing Hein v. Freedom
from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 611 (2007) (“The
constitutional requirements for federal-court jurisdiction—including the
standing requirements and
Article III—’are an essential ingredient of separation and equilibration of
powers.’”) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 101
(1998)).
20. See Stern, supra note 16, at 93 (“Article III defines the role of the
federal courts, and thereby prevents those courts from exercising powers more
properly left to the legislative and executive branches . . . .”).
21. See Lee & Ellis, supra note 19, at 175–76 (listing Supreme Court
opinions from the 1970s that expounded standing requirements including
Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 39–44 (1976), Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490, 494–504 (1975), and Linda R.S. v. Richard, 410 U.S. 614, 616–18
(1973)).
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Wildlife.22 Ultimately, to confer standing a plaintiff must assert
an injury-in-fact (which the Court articulated as the invasion or
violation of a legally protected interest), there must be causal
connection between the plaintiff’s injury and the defendant’s
conduct complained of, and the injury must be capable of being
redressed by a favorable decision.23 These three elements can be
summarized as: (1) injury-in-fact; (2) causation; and (3)
redressability.24 Although the causation and redressability
prong are important elements to the standing doctrine and have
kept many environmental lawsuits out of court, they are outside
the scope of this Note.25
i.

Injury-in-Fact

The Supreme Court has provided additional guidance
regarding what an injury-in-fact must entail. According to
Lujan, an injury-in-fact must be “concrete and particularized”
(as opposed to a generalized grievance) and “actual or imminent”
(not conjectural or hypothetical).26 This essentially puts the
burden on the plaintiff to demonstrate that the injury is personal
to them and has either already occurred or is “imminent.”27 Suits
have been withheld from court under the “actual or imminent”
requirement for being either temporally deficient (the harm will
occur too far in the future) or too conjectural (there is not a
sufficient probability of the harm occurring).28 “With respect to
22. 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
23. Id.
24. See Lee & Ellis, supra note 21, at 176 (“[T]he [Supreme] Court made it
clear that Article III requires a plaintiff to demonstrate three things in order to
maintain any action in federal court: injury-in-fact, causation, and
redressability.”).
25. There is expansive scholarship in this field, including research on ways
ecosystem services can be used to prove proximate causation in environmental
tort suits. See, e.g., Sanne H. Knudsen, The Long-Term Tort: In Search of a New
Causation Framework for Natural Resource Damages, 108 NW. L. REV. 475,
480–84 (2014) (explaining the difficulties in proving causation for natural
resource damages and advocating for a new remedy for long-term ecological
injuries, adoption of a lenient version of the substantial factor test).
26. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
27. See Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 625 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“[T]he
burden [to show standing] grows as the litigation progresses.”).
28. See Fero v. Excellus Health Plan, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 3d 735, 753
(W.D.N.Y 2017) (finding that plaintiffs that were victims of a data breach but
had yet to experience any misuse of their personally identifiable information
did not have an imminent or “certainly impending” harm arising from an
increased risk of future injury); see also Lee & Ellis, supra note 19 at 176–80
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injury in fact, ‘[t]he relevant showing for purposes of Article III
standing . . . is not injury to the environment but injury to the
plaintiff.’”29
Recently, in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins the Supreme Court
confirmed that the “concrete” factor of injury-in-fact must be de
facto (actually exist) and not “abstract.”30 Therefore, a mere
procedural violation of a statute without a de facto injury will
not establish Article III standing.31 However, the Court also
confirmed that an injury can be intangible and that “history and
the judgment of Congress play important roles” in determining
whether an intangible harm constitutes injury in fact.32
Allegations of a mere procedural violation often come up in
environmental lawsuits when a plaintiff attempts to bring a
claim under a citizen suit provision of a federal statute.33 The
Endangered Species Act (ESA) contains such a provision, which
grants the public the right to sue defendants for violation of the
statute.34 However, federal courts have refused to adjudicate
ESA citizen suit cases if the plaintiff lacks an actual injury and
can only raise a procedural violation of the statute.35
The “showing of [an] individual injury has proven to be the
most difficult element for environmental activists to show

(explaining the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the “concrete and
particularized” and “actual or imminent” injury-in-fact requirements).
29. Pub. Emps. for Envtl. Responsibility v. Schroer, No. 3:14-cv-589-HBG,
2017 WL 943942, at *5 (E.D. Tenn. 2017) (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.
Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000)).
30. 136 S.Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016).
31. Id. at 1549.
32. Id. at 1549 (“Congress may ‘elevat[e] . . . injuries that were previously
inadequate in law.’”) (quotation omitted).
33. See, e.g., Navajo v. Dep’t of Interior, 876 F.3d 1144, 1161–62 (9th Cir.
2017) (explaining the procedural protections granted under the National
Environmental Policy Act) (“NEPA”)); Wildearth Guardians v. U.S. Dep’t. of
Agric., 795 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2015) (analyzing plaintiff’s standing to
bring a procedural claim for a violation of NEPA).
34. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(A) (2012) (“Except as provided in paragraph (2)
of this subsection any person may commence a civil suit on his own behalf . . . to
enjoin any person, including the United States and any other governmental
instrumentality or agency . . . who is alleged to be in violation of any provision
of this chapter or regulation issued under the authority thereof . . . .”).
35. See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 34 F.
Supp. 3d 50, 60 (2014) (citing Fla. Audubon Soc. v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 667
(D.C.Cir.1996) (“To establish standing to challenge the Service’s failure to abide
by a statutory procedure, Plaintiffs must show that the procedures in question
are “designed to protect some threatened concrete interest” of their members.”).
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during the litigation process” as many environmental harms
affect a vast array of individuals.36 However, despite this
difficulty courts have found that an injury-in-fact may stem from
environmental harms that impact many individuals. For
example, in Sierra Club v. Morton, the Court held that injuryin-fact could include harm to the aesthetics of nature so long as
the plaintiff had personally visited the place in question to enjoy
its beauty.37 Justice Stewart also warned against denying
plaintiffs standing just because the harm impacts a large
number of people in United States v. Students Challenging
Regulatory Agency Procedures.38
It is important to note that the judicially-developed Article
III standing requirements only apply to federal courts.39 State
courts are not bound by the federal constitutional mandate that
restricts federal court jurisdiction to only “cases or
controversies.”40 Instead, each state court’s jurisdictional limits
are defined either by the state’s constitution or other state
legislation.41 While federal courts can only hear cases or
controversies, state courts can hear anything their legislature
grants them jurisdiction to adjudicate over.42 This Note only
addresses the standing requirements of federal courts.

36. Trayce A. Hockstad, Rats and Trees Need Lawyers Too: Community
Responsibility in Deodand Practice and Modern Environmentalism, 18 VT. J.
ENVTL. L. 105, 118 (2016).
37. 405 U.S. 727, 734–35 (1972).
38. 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973) (“But we have already made it clear that
standing is not to be denied simply because many people suffer the same
injury.”).
39. See ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1992) (“[S]tate courts
are not bound to adhere to federal standing requirements . . . .”).
40. Id. (“We have recognized often that the constraints of Article III do not
apply to state courts, and accordingly the state courts are not bound by the
limitations of a case or controversy or other federal rules of justiciability even
when they address issues of federal law . . . .”).
41. See Calvin Massey, Standing in State Courts, State Law, and Federal
Review, 53 DUQ. L. REV. 401, 404–05 (2015) (“[S]tates are free to set their
own standing rules independent of the Article III limits on standing applicable
to federal courts . . . .”) (citation omitted).
42. Id. at 409 (explaining that a state legislature could expand standing by
authorizing any citizen to assert a generalized grievance in state court).
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B. LANDMARK CASES ON ENVIRONMENTAL STANDING
Many environmental cases have lost based on a failure to
establish standing.43 As the Environmental Law Practice Guide
states, “[s]tanding to institute a legal action is a vital issue in
environmental litigation, where plaintiffs often lack the
pecuniary injury that furnishes standing in most civil
litigation.”44 This note will discuss two landmark cases that have
shaped the field of environmental standing: Lujan and Sierra
Club. Later this Note will use the fact pattern in Lujan to
demonstrate how the plaintiffs may have been able to allege a
more concrete and colorable standing argument by using an ESV
methodology.
i.

Sierra Club v. Morton

Sierra Club v. Morton is a formative case that centered
around the Disney company’s plans to turn Mineral King Valley,
a scenic wilderness area in the Sequoia National Forest
designated as a national game refuge, into a mega ski resort.45
The Forest Service approved Disney’s plan in 1969 under what
would be a 30-year use permit from the Forest Service.46
Following this, Sierra Club sued “as a membership corporation
with ‘a special interest in the conservation and the sound
maintenance of the national parks, game refuges and forests’”
and sought a declaratory judgment that various aspects of the
proposed development violated federal laws and regulations
protecting national parks, forests, and game refuges.47 The
Sierra Club centered its right to challenge the Forest Service’s
action under the citizen suit provision of the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) which reads “[a] person suffering legal
wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or

43. See William Blake Ogden, Improving Standing Doctrine to Better
Protect the Environment: How the United States Can Learn from Ecuador’s
Rights of Nature, 46 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 2 (“Standing requirements are
viewed as the ‘most persistent constitutional quandary for environmental
law.’”) (citing Holly Doremus, The Persistent Problem of Standing in
Environmental Law, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10956 (2010)).
44. PHILLIP WEINBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW PRACTICE GUIDE
§ 11B.03(1) (Michael B. Gerrard ed., Matthew Bender) (2018).
45. 405 U.S. 727, 728–29 (1972).
46. Id. at 729.
47. Id. at 730.
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aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant
statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.”48
The Supreme Court stated the proper inquiry to analyze
Sierra Club’s standing to sue was “whether the statute in
question [APA] authorizes review at the behest of the
plaintiff.”49 Based on precedent,50 the Court laid out one of the
now familiar standing requirements it found the APA required:
an “injury in fact.”51 While the Court acknowledged that harm
to scenic, aesthetic, or environmental well-being “may amount to
an ‘injury in fact’ sufficient to lay the basis for standing,” it also
made clear that the “party seeking review [must] be himself
among the injured.”52
That a plaintiff must show a particularized injury to herself,
is now well known in the environmental law landscape.53
Because Sierra Club failed to show that any of “its members
use[d] Mineral King for any purpose,” or “in any way that would
be significantly affected by the proposed actions of the [Forest
Service/Disney],” the Court found it had not met federal
standing requirements.54 Ultimately, Sierra Club failed in its
attempt to allege standing based on its status as a
“representative of the public” in a case concerning the use of
natural resources for the public.55 The “representative theory”
was in direct opposition to the limitation that federal courts only
review cases in which there are parties with direct stakes in the
outcome.56 Sierra Club’s holding had significant ramifications on
how, and which, environmental lawsuits were brought in federal
court and it created the traditional standing strategy in which
environmental nonprofits identify a member of their

48. Id. at 732–33 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012)).
49. Id. at 732 (citations omitted).
50. See id. at 733–34 (citing Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs, Inc. v.
Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970) and Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970)).
51. Id. at 734.
52. Id. at 734–35.
53. See WEINBERG, supra note 44, § 11B.03(1)(b) (“In drafting a complaint
on behalf of an environmental group, it is becoming critically important to
assert definite injury, or impending injury, to members of the group in the most
specific terms.”).
54. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 735.
55. Id. at 729, 736, 740.
56. Id. at 740.
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organization particularly affected by the issue[s] they are
challenging.57
ii. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife
Another seminal environmental standing case, decided
twenty years after Sierra Club, is Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife.58 In Lujan, plaintiffs were members of the non-profit
Defenders of Wildlife (“Defenders”).59 The plaintiffs challenged
a Department of the Interior (DOI) regulation limiting the scope
of the Endangered Species Act’s consultation requirement to
only projects or activities that occurred inside the United States
or on the high seas.60 Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA requires each
federal agency to consult with DOI to ensure “any action
authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency . . . is not
likely to jeopardize the continued existence [or habitat] of any
endangered species or threatened species.”61 Previously, DOI
had interpreted this provision of the ESA as requiring
consultation for agency activities both domestically and
abroad.62 Upon DOI’s publication of its new regulation in 1986,
the Defenders brought suit seeking a federal court injunction
requiring DOI to promulgate a new regulation based on its
initial interpretation.63
The Supreme Court focused on two specific plaintiffs, Joyce
Kelly and Amy Skilbred, each of whom the Court of Appeals
found had a sufficient injury-in-fact to meet standing
requirements.64 Each plaintiff alleged a risk of future injury
stemming from U.S. agencies funding and involvement in dam
projects aboard.65 The first project of concern was the

57. See, e.g., Lee & Ellis, supra note 19, at 188 (“In Lujan, the lawyers for
Defenders of Wildlife assembled declarations in an effort to surmount this
requirement.”).
58. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
59. See id. at 559, 563.
60. See id. at 558–59 (“A revised joint regulation, reinterpreting § 7(a)(2) to
require consultation only for actions taken in the United States or on the high
seas, was . . . promulgated in 1986, 51 Fed. Reg. 19926; 50 CFR 402.01 (1991).”).
61. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (incorporating what has come to be known as
the consultation requirement).
62. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 558–59 (1992).
63. Id. at 559.
64. Id. at 563.
65. Id.
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rehabilitation of the Aswan Dam on the Nile river.66 The Aswan
Dam threatened the habitat of the endangered Nile crocodile, a
species that plaintiff Kelly, a conservation biologist, had
observed before and hoped to see again in the future.67
The second project of concern was the Mahewali Dam
project in Sri Lanka.68 Plaintiff Skilbred, who had traveled to the
project area of the Mahewali Dam in Sri Lanka to study and
observe endangered Asian elephant and leopards, testified that
the Dam could “seriously reduce endangered, threatened, and
endemic species habitat.”69 She went on to conclude that this
threat harmed her as she planned on returning to Sri Lanka to
observe and study the Asian elephant and leopards in the
future.70
The Supreme Court focused on the testimony of Kelly and
Skilbred and determined that both had failed to demonstrate
both an “actual or imminent” and concrete injury.71 The majority
reasoned that even if the agency-funded dams threatened the
listed species, plaintiffs affidavits contained no facts showing
damage to the species would result in an “imminent” injury to
themselves.72 Justice Scalia opined that both Kelly and
Skilbred’s affidavits, which professed general intentions to
return to Egypt and Sri Lanka to observe and study the
endangered species instead of concrete or specific plans to do so,
supported a finding that no “actual or imminent” injury had
occurred.73
Therefore, the Supreme Court held that although the ESA
contained a citizen suit provision, the plaintiffs were still
required to allege an injury-in-fact to themselves that was actual
and imminent and not a generalized grievance.74 Under the
standing doctrine, injury or harm to a threatened species is not

66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. (quoting Plaintiff Skilbred’s testimony).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 564.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See id. at 578 (“[Statutory] broadening [of] the categories of injury that
may be alleged in support of standing is a different matter from abandoning the
requirement that the party seeking review must himself have suffered an
injury.”) (citation omitted).
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enough without an individual tie or injury to the alleged action.75
Lujan illustrated the rising burden plaintiffs have to meet to
properly allege an injury-in-fact, shifted the way environmental
lawsuits were brought, and inspired a new wealth of scholarship
specifically addressing environmental standing requirements.76
C. ENVIRONMENTAL STANDING PROPOSALS TO DATE
The difficulty environmental plaintiffs face in establishing
standing has spurred a vast array of legal scholarship. For
example, a Westlaw search for the term “environmental
standing” shows a return of 436 law review and journal articles.
Three common theories discussed in this scholarship are
explained below: first the traditional standing theory, second the
ecosystem nexus theory, and third the intrinsic value of nature
theory.
i.

Traditional Standing Theory
What this Note will call the traditional standing theory was
established after Sierra Club v. Morton.77 Public interest
organizations, like Sierra Club or Defenders of Wildlife, look for
members of its organization that will be personally and
adversely affected by a federal action or that have already faced
environmental harm from a third party.78 Examples of common

75. See id. at 567 (“It goes beyond the limit, however, and into pure
speculation and fantasy, to say that anyone who observes or works with an
endangered species, anywhere in the world, is appreciable harmed by a single
project affecting some portion of the species with which he has no more specific
connection.”).
76. A Westlaw search for secondary sources with titles including “Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife” returned twenty-four law review and journal articles, one
CLE & seminar material, and one text & treatise.
77. See Bradley James Larsen, Meeting the Requirements of Standing: A
Framework for Environmental Interest Groups: Lujan v. National Wildlife
Federation, 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990), 14 HAMLINE L. R. 277, 297–98 (1990)
(explaining a framework for environmental litigators to follow to allege
standing including: (1) find an individual whose aesthetic, recreational, or
environmental interests have actually been harmed; (2) follow Sierra Club v.
Morton as a guideline and show that the plaintiff “use[s] the land for aesthetic
or recreational purposes such as hiking, hunting, and bird watching” and; (3)
redress each harm on a case-by-case basis); see also WEINBERG, supra note 44,
§ 11B.03 (providing a guideline for practitioners seeking to establish standing
in an environmental lawsuit in federal court).
78. See Larsen, supra note 77, at 297 (“[T]ime and money should be spent
on finding this individual [injured plaintiff] instead of wasting valuable
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suits in this area include members that will be harmed based on
a loss of recreation or aesthetic values from human development
or extraction in a national forest,79 a conservationist or biologist
whose career will be negatively impacted by an adverse agency
action,80 or an individual whose property or health have been
harmed from environmental degradation (e.g. fisherman who
lost income following the Exxon Valdez oil spill).81 Public
interest organizations will then allege an injury tied to its
particular member’s career, hobby, interest, health, or
property.82
Although in many environmental lawsuits it is not difficult
to find a plaintiff to meet these requirements, that is not always
the case. For example, in Lujan, based on the holding in Sierra
Club, Defenders of Wildlife attempted to find members of their
organization who were personally aggrieved by DOI’s action.83
However, the Supreme Court found that the members’ affidavits
failed to allege a sufficient injury-in-fact because they could not
establish when they would be harmed without any concrete
plans to return to the areas of concern.84 Because of these

resources bringing an action based on an individual whose connection to the
public land is tenuous at best.”).
79. See e.g., Sierra Club v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 99, 102–03 (D. Ala. 1971)
(reviewing lawsuit to enjoin sale of timber in Tongass National Forest brought
by, among other plaintiffs, “eighty Sierra Club members, many of whom enjoy
the timber sale area for scenic and recreational purposes such as hunting,
fishing, camping, hiking and canoeing”).
80. See e.g., Sharps v. U.S. Forest Serv., 823 F. Supp. 668, 671, 673 (D.S.D.
1993) (reviewing wildlife biologist’s challenge of Forest Service’s management
of prairie dog populations in the Nebraska National Forest claiming it would
result in a loss of swift fox species which he studies).
81. See In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1221 (9th Cir. 2001) (analyzing
appeal from a $5 billion punitive damage award stemming from economic harm
to commercial fisherman following the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Prince William
Sound, Alaska).
82. See e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562–63 (1992) (“Of
course, the desire to use or observe an animal species, even for purely esthetic
purposes, is undeniably a cognizable interest for purpose of standing. ‘But the
‘injury in fact’ test requires more than an injury to a cognizable interest. It
requires that the party seeking review be himself among the injured.’”) (quoting
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972)).
83. See e.g. Lee & Ellis, supra note 19, at 188 (“In Lujan, the lawyers for
Defenders of Wildlife assembled declarations in an effort to surmount this
requirement [set in Morton.]”).
84. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564 (“Such ‘some day’ intentions—without any
description of concrete plans, or indeed even any specification of when the some
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inherent limitations, plaintiffs and scholars have pushed for the
courts to accept other theories of standing.
ii. Ecosystem Nexus
In Lujan, attorneys for the plaintiffs went a step beyond the
traditional method and attempted to allege standing based on
an ecosystem nexus theory. As the brief describes it,
Defenders possesses standing based upon the injury suffered by its
members who use and enjoy any part of a contiguous ecosystem affected
by federal action for purposes of studying or observing endangered
species located in that ecosystem, even if the federal agency action
which is damaging those interests is located some distance away from
the tracts used by Defenders’ members.85

The theory held that because the international projects
would have ripple effects across the ecosystems in which they
were to be built, the plaintiffs could assert an injury based on
the harm that would occur in a remote unvisited area of the
ecosystem.86 Even if this remote area was not directly tied to the
plaintiff’s interest, harm to the remote area would ultimately
affect the entire ecosystem, including the portion on which the
plaintiffs claimed a particularized interest.87 Therefore,
Defenders attempted to link the degradation of one portion of
the ecosystem to a substantial likelihood that one of the member
plaintiffs particularized interest would be harmed.88
Justice Scalia dismissed this premise as a “novel” and
“inelegantly styled” standing theory.89 In the Court’s view, the
ecosystem nexus theory was not aligned with precedent that
held “a plaintiff claiming injury from environmental damage

day will be—do not support a finding of the ‘actual or imminent’ injury that our
cases require.”).
85. Brief for the Respondents, Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555
(1992) (No. 90-1424), 1991 WL 577004,
at *27 (Aug. 30, 1991) (emphasis added).
86. Id. at *28 (providing plaintiff’s testimony that “[t]he area that I visited
and the area of the Picchis-Palcazu project are contiguous areas of tropical
moist forest and reducing the population in one area affects the population in
its entirety”).
87. See id. (arguing that the “level of generality at which injury can occur”
is the ecosystem level based on the ESA’s declaration of purpose in section 2).
88. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 565 (“The first, inelegantly styled ‘ecosystem nexus,’
proposes that any person who uses any part of a ‘contiguous ecosystem’
adversely affected by a funded activity has standing even if the activity is
located a great distance away.”).
89. Id.
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must use the area affected by the challenged activity and not an
area roughly ‘in the vicinity of it.’”90 Although the ESA’s stated
purpose was to conserve ecosystems upon which endangered and
threatened species depend, the Court did not equate this
purpose to granting rights of action in “persons who use portions
of an ecosystem not perceptibly affected by the unlawful act in
question.”91
iii. Intrinsic Value of Nature
Another standing theory advanced centers around the idea
that nature has intrinsic value and thus should be granted legal
rights, the damage of which should be recognized by courts as
sufficient to grant standing.92 This theory was put forth by
Christopher Stone in 1972 in his article Should Trees Have
Standing.93 Stone argued that natural objects should be
appointed lawyers or guardians ad litem to advance their legal
rights (as is common practice for children, those deemed
“incompetent,” or other non-human entities like corporations,
estates, and universities).94 Stone’s theory finds support by the
works of Aldo Leopold in which he argued for recognition of “the
land ethic”—an expansion of traditional ethics beyond humans
to include all of the Earth.95 “In Leopold’s vision of a land
ethic, . . . care for people cannot be separated from care for the
land.”96

90. Id. at 565–66 (citing omitted).
91. Id.
92. See Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?—Toward
Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450, 456 (1972) (proposing
that legal rights should be given to natural objects and the natural environment
as a whole).
93. See Hockstad, supra note 36, at 117 (referencing Stone’s seminal law
review article: “it was not until 1972 that this argument [for protection in the
form of legal rights] was made for inanimate objects in the environment.”).
94. See Stone, supra note 92, at 464.
95. See ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC 238 (1949) (“There is as
yet no ethic dealing with man’s relation to land and to the animals and plants
which grow upon it . . . . The land-relation is still strictly economic, entailing
privileges but not obligations.”).
96. See
The
Land
Ethic,
THE
ALDO
LEOPOLD
FOUND.,
https://www.aldoleopold.org/about/the-land-ethic/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2019); see
also LEOPOLD, supra note 95, at 262 (“A thing is right when it tends to preserve
the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it
tends otherwise.”).
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Since 1972, similar scholarship has been produced arguing
that nature should be granted standing based on its intrinsic
value as opposed to any benefits it confers to an individual. Some
of this work has looked outside of the United States to countries
that have enacted legislation granting nature standing or have
incorporated nature’s rights into its constitution. For example,
in 2018 William Blake Ogden proposed that the United States
should look to Ecuador’s Right of Nature97 to advance
environmental standing doctrine.98 Similarly, advocates have
argued for legislation resembling New Zealand’s that granted
the Whangauni River, a sacred river considered an ancestor to
the Maori tribe, rights of personhood and appointed a committee
to act as guardians for the river.99 Closer to home, the White
Earth band of Ojibwe recently granted legal rights to wild rice,
a native grain in Minnesota that has important cultural and
spiritual significance to the tribe.100
Based on the theory first advanced by Stone—that natural
objects should possess legal rights in and of themselves—a
lawsuit was recently filed in federal district court listing the
Colorado River Ecosystem as a party in its own right.101
97. Ogden, supra note 43, at 7–8 (explaining how Article 71–74 of the 2008
Constitution of Ecuador granted legal rights to nature).
98. See CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA DEL ECUADOR [CONSTITUTION OF
THE REPUBLIC OF ECUADOR], Oct. 20, 2008, arts. 71–74 (granting standing
rights to anyone in Ecuador seeking to protect nature and enshrining nature’s
rights “to integral respect for its existence and for the maintenance and
regeneration of its life cycles, structure, functions, and evolutionary
processes.”).
99. See Mihena Tanasescu, Rivers Get Human Rights: They Can Sue to
Protect
Themselves,
SCI.
A M.
(June
19,
2017),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/rivers-get-human-rights-they-cansue-to-protect-themselves/; see also Advancing Legal Rights of Nature:
Timeline; COMMUNITY ENVTL. LEGAL DEF. FUND, https://celdf.org/rights/rightsof-nature/rights-nature-timeline/ (last updated Jan. 31, 2019).
100. See Jennifer Bjorhus, Minnesota Tribe Asks: Can Wild Rice Have its
own
Legal
Rights?,
STAR
TRIB.
(Feb.
9,
2019),
http://www.startribune.com/minnesota-tribe-asks-can-wild-rice-have-its-ownlegal-rights/505618712/ (“[T]he state’s largest Indian tribe, the White Earth
Band of Ojibwe, has passed a tribal law granting wild rice its own enforceable
legal rights, much like those enjoyed by American citizens.”).
101. See Allison Katherine Athens, An Indivisible and Living Whole: Do We
Value Nature Enough to Grant it Personhood?, 45 ECOLOGY L. Q. 187, 191, 193
(2018) (explaining attempts to expand legal rights to nature and ultimately
arguing that “nature . . . has intrinsic value and thus should be entitled to legal
personhood”) (citing Stone, supra note 92, at 456); see also Complaint at ¶
4, Colo. River Ecosystem v. Colorado, No. 1:17-cv-02316, 2017 WL 4284548 (D.
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Following filing of the lawsuit, attorney Jason Flores-Williams
withdrew the complaint after threats of sanctions and
disbarment.102 The Colorado Attorney General issued a
statement stating the suit was correctly dismissed with
prejudice because “the case itself unacceptably impugned the
State’s sovereign authority to administer natural resources for
public use, and was well beyond the jurisdiction of the judicial
branch of government.”103
D. WHAT ARE ECOSYSTEM SERVICES & HOW CAN YOU VALUE
THEM?
i.

Ecosystem Services
Simply put, ecosystem services are the tangible benefits
that ecosystems provide to humans.104 Defined more specifically
by James Salzman in A Policy Maker’s Guide to Designing
Payments for Ecosystem Services ecosystem services are “the
interactions
of
living
organisms
with
their
environment . . . [that] provide both the conditions and
processes that sustain human life.”105 Examples of the ecosystem
services required to produce a natural good, like apples, are
pollination, pest control, and soil fertility.106 Other examples of
ecosystem services are flood mitigation benefits provided by

Colo. Sept. 25, 2017) (“Through this action, the Plaintiffs are asking this Court
to recognize and declare that the Colorado River is capable of possessing rights
similar to a ‘person’ . . . .”).
102. Athens, supra note 101, at 191 (citing Chris Walker, Attorney to
Withdraw Colorado River Lawsuit Under Threat of Sanctions, WESTWORD (Dec.
4,
2017),
http://www.westword.com/news/colorado-river-lawsuit-to-bewithdrawn-due-to-potential-sanctions-9746311).
103. Chris Walker, Attorney to Withdraw Colorado River Lawsuit Under
Threat
of
Sanctions, WESTWORD (Dec.
4,
2017),
http://www.westword.com/news/colorado-river-lawsuit-to-be-withdrawn-dueto-potential-sanctions-9746311.
104. See Anna Maria Carcamo, A New Democratic Approach to Ecosystem
Service Valuation: An
Experiment in New Hampshire, YALE ENV’T. REV. (Apr. 23, 2018) (“Ecosystem
services are benefits that ecosystems provide to humans.”).
105. JAMES SALZMAN, A POLICY MAKER’S GUIDE TO DESIGNING PAYMENTS
FOR ECOSYSTEM SERVICES 4 (Aug. 27, 2009); J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, The
Law and Policy Beginnings of Ecosystem Services, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L.
157, 157 (2007).
106. SALZMAN, supra note 105.
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wetlands107 or carbon sequestration by forests.108 Ecosystem
services are broken down into four categories under the
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment109:
(1) provisioning services (products obtained from ecosystems); (2)
regulating services (benefits obtained from the regulation of ecosystem
processes); (3) cultural services (the non-material benefits that people
obtain from ecosystems through spiritual enrichment, cognitive
development, reflection, recreation, and aesthetic experiences) that
directly affect people and; (4) supporting services needed to maintain
other services.110

“Ecosystem service valuation [ESV] is a method for
assigning economic value” to these ecosystem services.111 It is
essentially a “methodology for identifying environmental
benefits created by ecosystems” and then calculating the
monetary value these benefits provide.112 ESVs can help define
the monetary benefits an ecosystem service provides to society
or, alternatively, the costs or damages that result from the
destruction of an ecosystem service.113
ii. Economic Valuation Approach
Ecosystem services are valued in a variety of ways, but one
well-known framework is the economic value approach. The
economic value approach measures both use and nonuse values
derived from ecosystems.114 Use values include physical
107. See John K. Pattinson-Williams et al., Wetlands, Flood Control and
Ecosystem Services in the Smith Creek Drainage Basin: A Case Study in
Saskatchewan, Canada, 147 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 36, 37–38 (2018); J.B. Ruhl &
R. Juge Gregg, Integrating Ecosystem Services into the Law: A Case Study of
Wetland Mitigation Banking, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 365, 366 (2001).
108. SALZMAN, supra note 105, at 4.
109. The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment was a global study involving
1,360 experts to assess “the consequences of ecosystem change from human
well-being.” Five technical volumes and six synthesis reports appraise “the
conditions and trends in the world’s ecosystems and the services they provide.”
About the Millennium Assessment, MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT,
https://www.millenniumassessment.org/en/About.html# (last visited Mar. 5,
2019).
110. SALZMAN, supra note 105, at 5.
111. Carcamo, supra note 104; see also Sutton, supra note 13 (describing
recent estimates that put the total global value of ecosystem services (US$125
trillion) at twice as much as the world’s gross domestic product (US$75 trillion)).
112. Ori Sharon et al., Ecosystem Services and Judge-Made Law: A Review
of Legal Cases in Common Law Countries, 32 ECOSYSTEM SERVS. 9, 16 (2018).
113. See id.
114. BRUCE PEACOCK, NAT’L PARK SERV., VALUING ECOSYSTEM SERVICES IN
NATURAL
RESOURCE
DAMAGE
ASSESSMENTS
6
(2009),
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interactions with ecosystems both currently and in the future
and are divided into two subsets consumptive use values and
non-consumptive values.115 Consumptive use values include
activities like hunting and fishing while non-consumptive use
values include activities like wildlife viewing and hiking.116 Nonuse values on the other hand are derived independently from any
physical interaction with ecosystems.117 For example, the value
a person gains from merely knowing that an ecosystem exists or
will be preserved.118
Different methods employed to calculate use and nonuse
values include; travel cost,119 contingent valuation,120 conjoint
analysis,121 and willingness to pay.122 In a willingness to pay
evaluation an individual will be asked how much they would be

https://conference.ifas.ufl.edu/aces08/presentations/Acacia56/Tuesday/pm/(2)%20B%20Peacock.pdf; see also Sharon et al., supra note 112,
at 10 (explaining how natural resource economists use both use values and nonuse values to consider the economic welfare benefits of nature).
115. PEACOCK, supra note 114 at 12–13.
116. Id. at 12.
117. Id. at 13.
118. See Ohio v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 457 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(recognizing non-use values as potentially valid components of damage
assessment awards).
119. See Ivana Logar, Travel-Cost Method, ENVTL. JUST. ORG., LIABILITIES
& TRADE, http://www.ejolt.org/2013/01/travel-cost-method/ (last visited Mar. 6,
2019) (describing how the travel-cost method can be used to calculate the
economic value of environmental goods by measuring the total costs, including
time and opportunity costs, that a person will spend to visit a or use the natural
good).
120. See Ivana Logar, Contingent Valuation, ENVTL. JUST. ORG., LIABILITIES
& TRADE, http://www.ejolt.org/2012/12/contingent-valuation/ (last visited Mar.
6, 2019) (measuring the benefits provided by ecosystem services by asking
“representative sample of the concerned local population how much they would
have been willing to pay (in the forms of taxes for instance) in order” to receive
the services and then “adding these results over the whole population” to get a
“monetary representation of the benefits obtained”).
121. See DAVID A. HARPMAN, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, INTRODUCTION
TO CONJOINT ANALYSIS FOR VALUING ECOSYSTEM AMENITIES (2008),
https://www.usbr.gov/tsc/techreferences/economics/conjoint/TMEC200803.pdf
(“Conjoint analysis is based on a primary survey of individuals utilizing a
carefully designed survey instrument. Respondents are presented with
different hypothetical situations, described using their characteristics or
attributes and asked either to rank them or choose between them. Using the
resultant survey data, the probability that an individual will rank or choose any
particular scenario is then estimated. The consumer surplus or net economic
value of the amenity can then be derived.”).
122. See PEACOCK, supra note 114, at 6.
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willing to pay to benefit from an ecosystem service, e.g.—to see
the Grand Canyon and enjoy its aesthetic beauty.123 However,
because of the varied and wide-ranging figures this question can
produce, researches sometimes ask the opposite question—how
much an individual would have to be paid never to utilize the
ecosystem service—or in the example posed, to never see the
Grand Canyon or enjoy its beauty.124 Flipped around, this is
known as willingness to accept.125
iii. Ecosystem Service Valuation Platforms & Tools
There are a variety of resources, platforms, and models that
have been developed to assist with ESV.126 This Note will refer
to these collectively as ESV platforms. The goal of these
platforms is to reduce the cost and time to preform full ESVs in
order to integrate the true value of ecosystem services into
decision making, planning, management, and payment for
ecosystem service markets.127
These tools utilize publicly accessible environmental data, then model
the amount of services provided by a target ecosystem service using
coefficients obtained from other studies. Compared to economic
valuation models, these tools can provide quick estimation at a large
scale, while maintaining a relatively low cost in terms of both time and
money.128

Examples of some well-known and established ESV
platforms are the: Ecosystem Valuation Toolkit from Earth
Economics,129 Integrated Valuation of Ecosystem Services and
123. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., VALUING
ECOSYSTEM SERVICES: TOWARD BETTER ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONMAKING 48
(2005), https://www.nap.edu/read/11139/chapter/1 (explaining how willingness
to pay and willingness to accept are used in economic valuations of
environmental goods).
124. See id. at 48–49.
125. See id. at 49.
126. See generally PAUL BURGESS, SIYU QIN & XIANGYI LI, MANGROVES IN
ECUADOR—AN APPLICATION AND COMPARISON OF ECOSYSTEM SERVICES
VALUATION
MODELS
14
(2015),
https://dukespace.lib.duke.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/10161/9597/Burgess%
20Qin%20Li%20MP.pdf?sequence=1 (studying and comparing different
ecosystem service valuation models on the market to calculate the value of
ecosystem services from Ecuador’s mangroves).
127. See id. (explaining how the development of tools and models are
intended to promote implementation of ESV).
128. Id.
129. Ecosystem
Valuation
Toolkit,
EARTH
ECON.,
http://www.eartheconomics.org/ecosystem-valuation-toolkit/ (last visited Mar.
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Tradeoffs (InVEST),130 and the UN-REDD (Reducing Emissions
from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing
Countries) Programme.131 These resources can be used by
governments, nongovernmental organizations, researchers, or
individuals looking to accurately calculate the value of an
ecosystem (e.g. a specific river basin) or a particular resource of
interest (e.g. coastal shoreline).
A study by Paul Burgess, Siyu Qin, Xiangyi Li compared a
number of these platforms by using each to complete an
ecosystem services assessment to calculate the value of
Ecuador’s mangroves. One of the platforms used in the study to
calculate the value of blue carbon storage and coastal protection
Ecuador’s mangroves provided was InVEST.132 InVEST was
developed by the Natural Capital Project133 and has fifteen
different models covering different ecosystem services including
carbon storage and sequestration, crop pollination, habitat risk
assessment, sediment retention, and coastal vulnerability.134 It
is a suite of open-source software models that uses maps and
spatial data inputs (i.e. amount of crop cover or forest cover) to
return “results in either biophysical terms (e.g., tons of carbon

6, 2019) (“Our Ecosystem Valuation Toolkit (EVT) is a comprehensive,
searchable database of ecosystem service values. The quantity and quality of
our data and the advanced filtering and reporting tools we’ve developed allow
Earth Economics to quickly and reliably generate ecosystem service values for
virtually any location and ecosystem in the world.”).
130. What
is
InVEST,
NAT.
CAPITAL
PROJECT,
https://naturalcapitalproject.stanford.edu/invest/#what-is-invest (last visited
Mar. 6, 2019) (“InVEST is a suite of free, open-source software models used to
map and value the goods and services from nature that sustain and fulfill
human life.”).
131. UN-REDD Programme, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un-redd.org/
(last visited Mar. 6, 2018) (creating a financial value for carbon stored in forests
and then paying developing countries the social costs saved from their
reductions in carbon emissions from deforestation).
132. BURGESS, QIN & LI, supra note 126, at 32–35.
133. Natural Capital Project is a partnership between Stanford University,
the Chinese Academy of Sciences, the University of Minnesota, the Stockholm
Resilience Center, The Nature Conservancy, and the World Wildlife Fund that
works to improve the well-being of all people and nature by motivating greater
and more targeted natural capital investments. Who We Are, NAT. CAPITAL
PROJECT,
https://naturalcapitalproject.stanford.edu/what-is-naturalcapital/#who-we-are (last visited Apr. 6, 2019).
134. What is InVEST, supra note 130.

2019]

ESTABLISHING AN "INJURY-IN-FACT"

461

sequestered) or economic terms (e.g., net present value of that
carbon sequestered).”135
Burgess’ study found that InVEST was one of the most
useful platforms to analyze the value of mangroves in Ecuador,
as it first calculated the amount of biophysical goods the
mangroves produced, then estimated the social benefits
generated from the mangroves, and finally converted these into
market based values, social preferences, and coefficients adopted
from other studies.136 InVEST also allows users to “adjust and
manipulate the assumptions used in the model, thereby allowing
the measurement of ecosystem services under different natural
or socio-economic conditions.”137 Using InVEST the study
calculated that “the current mangroves in Ecuador can
sequestrate over twenty three metric tons of carbon over 20
years, which will avoid a social cost of $378 million.”138
E. ECOSYSTEM SERVICES IN THE LAW TODAY
Ecosystem services are not a new concept. Since the late
1990s there has been a growing volume of literature in the
area.139 Early on, scholarship focused on explanations on what
ecosystem services were, debates over proper valuation methods,
and advocating for the application of ecosystem services in
ecological management.140 It has since evolved into calls for the
incorporation of ecosystem services into decision making,
common law claims, and marketplaces to pay for ecosystem
services.141
135. Id.
136. BURGESS, QIN & LI, supra note 126, at 20.
137. What is InVEST, supra note 130.
138. BURGESS, QIN & LI, supra note 126, at 33.
139. Sharon et al., supra note 112, at 11 (“[A] search for the term “ecosystem
services” in Westlaw’s Law Reviews and Journals database shows that the
number of articles using the term grew from 16 to 1427 in the twenty-year time
span from 1995 to 2015.”).
140. See Salzman, supra note 12, at 887–88 (explaining how our very
survival depends on the services that Earth’s ecosystem provides).
141. See SALZMAN, supra note 105, at 15, 20–40 (describing how successful
payment for ecosystem services markets can be designed). For a detailed
comprehensive review of the world’s payment for ecosystem services programs,
see generally James Salzman et al., The Global Status and Trends of Payments
for Ecosystem Services, 1 NATURE SUSTAINABILITY 136, 136 (2018) (“In economic
terms, PES [payments for ecosystem services] seeks to internalize the positive
externalities (that is, the third-party benefits) generated by natural systems,
creating incentives for landholder behavior that ensures service provision.”).
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Ecosystem services have also started to appear in different
areas of the law, in the form of federal decision making,142
natural resource damage assessments,143 and settlement and
damage calculation frameworks.144 Even more recently
“[p]laintiffs have successfully used ecosystem services
terminology to express the form of injury needed to establish
standing.”145 In Ellis v. Bradbury,146 Plaintiffs alleged standing
by describing the loss of ecosystem services that would result
from EPA’s continued approval of pesticides, including lost
utilization of habitats that the impacted pollinators provided.147
The Court held that these interests were sufficient to confer
standing.148
142. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
MEMORANDUM FOR EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS & AGENCIES ON INCORPORATING
ECOSYSTEM SERVICES INTO FEDERAL DECISION MAKING (2015),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/
memoranda/2016/m-16-01.pdf
(directing
“agencies
to
develop
and
institutionalize policies to promote consideration of ecosystem services, where
appropriate and practicable, in planning, investments, and regulatory
contexts.”).
143. A codified system of recovery for ecosystem services exists under six
environmental federal statutes: CERCLA; CWA; OPA; NMSA and; PSRPA.
Karen Bradshaw, Settling for Natural Resource Damages, 40 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 211, 227 (2016).
144. In Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area, the
International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) carefully considered an environmental
damages compensation lawsuit against Nicaragua for lost ecosystem services
resulting from degradation of 6.3 hectares of wetland 300 uprooted trees. Jim
Salzman, International Court of Justice Recognizes and Values Ecosystem
Services
(Sort
of),
LEGALPLANET
(Feb.
6,
2018),
http://legalplanet.org/2018/02/06/international-court-of-justice-recognizes-and-valuesecosystem-services-sort-of/ (summarizing the case and explaining its
importance for expansion of ecosystem services in the law). Earth Economics, a
natural capital valuation company, even offers workshops on how to apply ESV
to calculate legal damage assessments. Workshops and Training, EARTH ECON.,
http://www.eartheconomics.org/workshops-and-training (last visited Mar. 6,
2019).
145. Sharon et al., supra note 112, at 13.
146. 2014 WL 1569271 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2013).
147. Complaint at ¶ 32, Ellis v. Bradbury, No. C131266, 2014 WL 1569271
(No. C131266), 2013 WL 1164622
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2013). (“Plaintiffs and their members have personally
visited the ranges of directly impacted ESA-listed invertebrates’ and ‘enjoy
utilizing those species for recreational, aesthetic, and other uses, and intend to
continue to visit those habitats and enjoy those species and the ecosystem
services they provide.”).
148. Ellis v. Bradbury, 2014 WL 1569271, at *13–14 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 21,
2013).
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However, in Public Employees for Environmental
Responsibility v. Schroer (“PEER”) the Court dismissed
plaintiff’s complaint that the Tennessee Department of
Transportation’s failure to comply with its CWA 404 permit
wetland mitigation plan was harming his aesthetic,
recreational, and wildlife preservation interests in Cherokee
Lake.149 The Plaintiff attempted to relate his injury to the loss
of ecosystem services the wetlands in question provide to
Cherokee Lake.150 The Court found that plaintiff had failed to
demonstrate an actual individualized injury as opposed to a
generalized grievance.151
A study reviewing cases in common law countries that
addressed the concept of ecosystem services explained that
substantial differences between the two plaintiffs standing
claims resulted in the opposite results—namely the “nature of
the proceeding, the alleged harm, and the resource at stake.”152
In Ellis the plaintiffs used the ecosystem service terminology to
describe protected interests that have long been recognized as
conferring standing (recreational, aesthetic, existence value, and
pollination interests).153 However, in PEER the plaintiffs used
the ecosystem services terminology to describe a form of injury
not a protected interest.154 Comparing these two cases, the study
concluded that
plaintiffs seeking to establish standing based on assertions of a factual
link between (1) a reduction in ecosystem services . . . and (2) a
concrete injury to a specific individual, should put forward careful and
specific allegations that tie the harmful action as closely as possible to
the alleged injury.155

149. Pub. Emps. for Envtl. Responsibility v. Schroer, No. 3:14-cv-589-HBG,
2017 WL 943942, at *5 (E.D. Tenn., 2017) (quoting Plaintiff’s Declaration) (“I
am concerned that the insufficiency of the wetlands mitigation at issue in this
case could be affecting the health of Cherokee lake and interfering with my
aesthetic, recreational and wildlife preservation interest in this river system.”).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Sharon et al., supra note 112, at 14.
153. See id.
154. PEER, 2017 WL 943942 at *5 (alleging damage to ecosystem services
from degradation of wetlands that helped support the health and viability of the
Cherokee watershed where plaintiff recreated).
155. Sharon et al., supra note 112, at 14.
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II. ANALYSIS
While the three common standing theories discussed in
Section I—traditional standing theory, ecosystem nexus
approach, and intrinsic value of nature theory—all have their
strengths, they are each limited by their applicable scope and
ability to prove an “actual or imminent” and “concrete and
particularized” injury-in-fact. Section A will highlight the
circumstances and scenarios where each of the three standing
proposals has failed. Applying ESVs as a tool to remedy these
gaps provides a potential solution to see fewer environmental
lawsuits dismissed under the Article III standing doctrine.
Section B will provide examples for how the application of an
ESV methodology in a standings analysis can sufficiently meet
the three elements of an injury-in-fact: (i) actual or imminent;
(ii) concrete; and; (iii) particularized. Section C will analyze the
potential for ESVs to remedy the gaps found in each one of the
standing proposals described by this Note by applying it to a
scenario where the commonly used theories have previously
failed.
A. LIMITATIONS OF PRIOR PROPOSALS TO ESTABLISH
ENVIRONMENTAL STANDING
i. The traditional standing theory often fails to find a plaintiff
who has suffered a concrete harm and an individual, not
generalized, grievance.
Under the traditional standing theory, public interest
organizations, like Sierra Club or Defenders of Wildlife, look for
members of their organizations that will be personally and
adversely affected by a federal action targeting the environment.
Alternatively, they look for members who have already
experienced environmental harm from a potential defendant.
Although the traditional environmental standing theory is often
sufficient, it has its limitations and weaknesses. For example, it
can be difficult to find the “right” plaintiff for cases in which an
environmental harm occurs in a remote area or to a rare species
that does not directly relate to a person’s livelihood, research, or
recreational interest.156

156. See, e.g., Diogo Verissimo & Bob Smith, When it Comes to Conservation,
Are Ugly Animals a Lost Cause, SMITHSONIAN (June 27, 2017),
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/are-ugly-animals-lost-cause-
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If it appears no plaintiff is affected by the environmental
harm, the organization cannot meet the “injury-in-fact”
requirement.157 This limitation was highlighted in Lujan when
Defenders of Wildlife were unable to identify a plaintiff the court
found was sufficiently injured from the government’s funding of
international dam projects, despite affidavits from Kelly and
Skilbred (both with professional backgrounds in wildlife
preservation) that described how they had visited, observed, and
planned to return to see endangered species potentially
impacted from the Aswan and Mahewali Dam.158
Furthermore, it can be difficult to prove a particularized
environmental harm under the traditional standing theory if the
harm is diffuse in nature and affects larger groups of people. A
common example of a diffuse environmental harm is air
pollution. Upon emission, the air pollutant disperses over wide
areas; for example, carbon molecules spread across the entire
globe after they are emitted into the air.159 Although the harm
to each individual may be small, the aggregate social costs may
be huge; but in order to challenge the polluter in court an
individual must be identified with both a particularized and
significant injury.160 Therefore, even if it appears that a plaintiff
can be identified under the traditional standing theory that will
meet the “actual or imminent” and “concrete” requirements of
the standing doctrine, establishing that the injury is personal to
them can be challenging.

180963807/ (explaining the plight of ugly or obscure threatened and endangered
species).
157. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envt’l Servs., Inc., 528
U.S. 167, 181 (2000) (“[It] is not injury to the environment but injury to the
plaintiff” that will confer Article III standing).
158. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992); see id. at 592
(Blackmun, J. dissenting).
159. See Abelkop, supra note 1, at 407 (illustrating the problem of a diffuse
pollutants like CO2 emissions in environmental law contexts).
160. See id. at 404 (“Diffuse effects do not afflict single and discretely
identifiable plaintiffs. Rather, they affect large populations of individuals—
many of whom may not even know that they are affected—over wide geographic
areas.”).
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ii. The expansive scope of the ecosystem nexus theory makes
it difficult for courts to connect the injury in one portion of the
ecosystem to the plaintiff’s injury.
Defenders of Wildlife also faced challenges in Lujan when it
claimed plaintiffs had suffered an adequate injury-in-fact under
the “ecosystem nexus theory of standing.”161 The Supreme Court
dismissed this theory as being “inelegantly styled” and
“inconsistent” with its precedent that held an injury stemming
from environmental damages had to occur in an area actually
affected by the challenged activity and not an area roughly “in
the vicinity” of it.162 Despite Defenders’ efforts to broaden
environmental standing to account for the interconnected
characteristics of ecosystems and nature,163 the Court found that
this was too broad an expansion of the standing doctrine.164
Justice Blackmun’s dissent in Lujan illustrates the exact
problems with the Supreme Court’s rejection of the ecosystem
nexus theory:
Many environmental injuries, however, cause harm distant from the
area immediately affected by the challenged action. Environmental
destruction may affect animals traveling over vast geographical
ranges, see, e.g., Japan Whaling Assn. v. American Cetacean
Society, 478 U.S. 221, 106 S.Ct. 2860, 92 L.Ed.2d 166 (1986) (harm to
American whale watchers from Japanese whaling activities), or rivers
running
long
geographical
courses,
see, e.g., Arkansas
v.
Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 112 S.Ct. 1046, 117 L.Ed.2d 239 (1992) (harm
to Oklahoma residents from wastewater treatment plant 39 miles from
border).165

Damages in one portion of an ecosystem can ricochet,
causing distant yet immense and significant harm to species,
aesthetic value, recreational lands, and more.166 If a plaintiff is
161. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 565 (dismissing plaintiffs’ alternative theories of
standing).
162. Id. at 565–66 (citing Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 887–
89 (1990)).
163. See id. at 565; see also Andrew Becker, Four Basic Components of an
Ecosystem, SCIENCING (Apr. 23, 2018), https://sciencing.com/four-basiccomponents-ecosystem-9557.html (“Ecosystems represent the interconnected
nature of living organisms and their world.”).
164. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 565.
165. Id. at 594 (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
166. See id. (explaining how pollution can spread far from the initial area of
discharge and yet still cause significant damages); see also Forest Die-Offs
Ricochet to Distant Ecosystems, NAT’L SCI. FOUND. (Nov. 16 , 2016),
https://www.nsf.gov/news/news_summ.jsp?cntn_id=190154 (“According to a
paper published today in the journal PLOS ONE, wiping out an entire forest
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required to show geographical proximity under an ecosystem
nexus theory, many environmental harms and plaintiffs who
wish to prevent them will not see their day in court. As
Blackmun’s dissent states, the majority’s opinion could be read
as precluding litigants who fail to “use the precise or exact site
where animals are slaughtered or where toxic waste is dumped
into a river” as a basis for standing.167
iii. Because of the potential breadth of standing under the
intrinsic value of nature theory, courts are hesitant to grant
legal rights to nature.
The last common standing theory discussed by this Note is
the intrinsic value of nature theory which argues that an injury
to animals, the environment, or natural resources should confer
standing without requiring a link to a human injury or
enterprise.168 If the natural world has intrinsic value, then it
should also be granted the ability to sue in its own right.169 This
theory has potential to be the most protective of nature.170 After
all, if nature has intrinsic value then it cannot be replaced with
a man-made or artificial resource that accomplishes the same
thing.171 Unfortunately, while this theory is exalted by those as

can have significant effects on global climate patterns and alter vegetation on
the other side of the world.”).
167. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 595 (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
168. See Susan Emmenegger & Axel Tschentscher, Taking Nature’s Rights
Seriously: The Long Way to Biocentrism in Environmental Law, 6 GEO. INT’L
ENVTL. L. REV. 545, 550 (“In the third stage [of international environmental law
development], the anthropocentric approach is transcended by the recognition
of an intrinsic value of nature, i.e. a value independent of human interest.”).
169. See Stone, supra note 92, at 456 (proposing that legal rights should be
given to natural objects and “the natural environment as a whole”).
170. From an ethical perspective, it is also the theory this Author is most
inclined to agree with.
171. See Ronald Sandler, Intrinsic Value, Ecology, and Conservation,
NATURE, https://www.nature.com/scitable/knowledge/library/intrinsic-valueecology-and-conservation-25815400 (last visited Jan. 23, 2019) (discussing why
the fields of ecology and conservation should be guided by a theory recognizing
the intrinsic value of nature).
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high as Pope Francis172 and has seen success in New Zealand173
and Ecuador,174 it has failed to achieve similar recognition in the
American court system.175
There are a number of reasons why America’s judiciary has
chosen not to follow the path of these other nations. Trayce A.
Hockstad discussed common arguments and philosophical
difficulties the intrinsic value of nature theory imposes in her
Note, Rats and Trees Need Lawyers Too: Community
Responsibility
in
Deodand
Practice
and
Modern
Environmentalism.176 According to Hockstad, humanity has long
distinguished itself from animals and nature based on
humankind’s rationality and free will.177 By granting nature
inherent legal rights, Hockstad argues, we would skew these
long-held distinctions.178 This would inevitably lead to debates
and arguments over the varying degrees of autonomy different
species hold.179
172. See Pope Francis, Encyclical Letter, Laudato Si’ of the Holy Father
Francis on Care for Our Common Home ¶ 84 (May 24, 2015),
http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/encyclicals/documents/papafrancesco_20150524_enciclica-laudato-si.html (“Each creature has its own
purpose. None is superfluous. The entire material universe speaks of God’s love,
his boundless affection for us. Soil, water, mountains: everything is, as it were,
a caress of God.”).
173. See Tanasescu, supra note 99 (explaining how New Zealand made the
Whanganui River a person under law).
174. See CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA DEL ECUADOR [CONSTITUTION OF
THE REPUBLIC OF ECUADOR], Oct. 20, 2008, arts. 71–74.
175. See, e.g., Colo. River Ecosystem v. Colorado, No. 1:17-cv-02316, 2017
WL 4284548 (D. Colo. Sept. 25, 2017) (threatening sanctions and disbarment if
case not withdrawn). But see, Order to Show Cause, The Nonhuman Rights
Project
v.
Breheny,
No.
18-45164
(Nov.
16,
2018),
https://www.courthousenews.com/ny-judge-grants-habeas-order-for-bronx-zooelephant/ (follow “order” hyperlink) (ordering respondent, Executive Vice
President of Bronx Zoo, to show cause why Happy, an elephant at the Bronx
Zoo, should not be released from Respondent’s custody to an appropriate
sanctuary).
176. Hockstad, supra note 36, at 122–25.
177. Id. at 123.
178. Id.
179. See, e.g., Christine Stuart, NY Judge Grants Habeas Order for Bronx
Zoo
Elephant,
COURTHOUSE
NEWS
SERV.
(Nov.
19,
2018),
https://www.courthousenews.com/ny-judge-grants-habeas-order-for-bronx-zooelephant/ (explaining how the Nonhuman Rights Project relied on Happy’s
cognitive abilities—she was the first elephant known to successfully pass the
self-recognition mirror test—as reasoning for why she should be protected from
being labeled a “thing” and granted a habeas petition to free her from the
confines of the Bronx zoo).

2019]

ESTABLISHING AN "INJURY-IN-FACT"

469

Another reason courts have not accepted the intrinsic value
of nature theory is based on their deference to states sovereignty.
In the Complaint filed on behalf of Colorado’s River Ecosystem,
the concern over granting a river in Colorado the rights to sue in
its own name centered around the prerogatives of the state of
Colorado as a sovereign entity.180 Few, if any, courts would wish
to adopt a legal theory that could restrict the sovereignty of the
state or federal government to enact policies and laws for fear of
harming natural resources. Indeed, the courts made their
opposition to this theory known when the attorney was forced to
withdraw the suit under threats of sanctions and disbarment.181
The potential expansive scope of an intrinsic value of nature
theory could send many judges off on a “parade of horribles”
analysis as well.182 One can easily imagine a Supreme Court
Justice partaking in the familiar practice of pushing an attorney
to see how far their legal theory could be stretched.183 For
example, a court may ask, “if a river has standing in its own right
to sue the government for failure to protect its rights to flow
what is to stop a ‘concerned citizen’ from bringing suit on behalf
of a squirrel that was negligently run over?”184

180. See Complaint at ¶ 4, Colo. River Ecosystem v. Colorado, No. 1:17-cv02316, 2017 WL 4284548 (D. Colo. Sep. 25, 2017); Walker, supra note 103
(explaining the trajectory of the lawsuit).
181. See Walker, supra note 103 (reporting on the lawyer’s threats of
sanctions and disbarment from the Colorado Attorney General’s Office).
182. See Ben Zimmer, Where did the Supreme Court get its ‘Parade of
Horribles’,
BOSTON
GLOBE
(July
1,
2012),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2012/06/30/where-did-supreme-court-getits-parade-horribles /Y0jnIscamtgPEzO0PdtL9N/story.html (explaining the
origins and providing examples of the “parade of horribles” expression in legal
analysis)
183. See id.
184. Cf. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 558 (2012)
(explaining the courts concern that upholding the individual mandate of the
Affordable Care Act on the basis of commerce clause grounds would expand
Congress’ power to the point that it could mandate individual’s purchase
broccoli for their “own sake”); Transcript of Oral Argument at 13, Dep’t of
Health & Human Services v. Florida, (No. 11-398) (U.S. 2012),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2011/11398-Tuesday.pdf (“JUSTICE SCALIA: Could you define the market—everybody
has to buy food sooner or later. So, you define the market as food; therefore,
everybody’s in the market; therefore, you can make people buy broccoli.”).
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B. ESTABLISHING STANDING THROUGH VALUATIONS OF
ECOSYSTEM SERVICES.
Because of the difficulties plaintiffs face in establishing a
sufficient injury-in-fact under the standing doctrine, litigators
should look to ESVs to fill in the gaps and compliment their
standing claims. As James Salzman stated in 1997, “[a]s our
understanding of ecological services develops, however, it well
may be possible with a degree of certainty to establish
connections between identifiable injuries and specific harms
to services such as pollination or water retention.”185 Twentytwo years later, we are now at a point where that degree of
certainty can be established.
i. By valuing lost or damaged ecosystem services a plaintiff
can establish an actual or imminent and concrete and
particularized injury-in-fact.
In an article that compiled cases in common law countries
that discussed ecosystem services (either by name or theory) the
authors made the recommendation that all ecosystem service
based standing claims use the terminology only to refer to an
already legally cognizable interest—such as aesthetics,
recreation, or existence values.186 “[R]eframing recognized
protected environmental interests as ecosystem services holds
more potential than introducing novel ecosystem services-based
legal theories.”187 Despite this warning, this Note proposes the
use of ecosystem service valuation methodologies as a tool to link
damages to ecosystem services to an “actual or imminent” and
“concrete and particularized” injury-in-fact. Instead of creating
a novel ecosystem services based legal standing theory, this
approach merely applies an already well accepted analytical
framework to a new area of the law. Ecosystem service valuation
methodologies, models, and platforms address some of the
limitations found in the common standing legal theories because
it puts environmental harms into a language courts already
understand—monetary damages.188

185. Salzman, supra note 12, at 901.
186. Sharon et al., supra note 112, at 14.
187. Id.
188. Civil litigation often involves lawsuits centered around claims for
monetary damages stemming from tort claims, contract breaches, and the like.
See, e.g., WEINBERG, supra note 44, § 11B.03(1) (“Standing to institute a legal
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a. Actual or Imminent Injury
The first thing to establish in a standing analysis is an
actual or imminent injury that is not conjectural or
hypothetical.189 Using ESV methodologies and platforms
described in this Note190 a plaintiff can link conduct by the
defendant to actual injuries stemming from a loss of ecosystem
services in the present moment, even if some of the effects will
happen in the future. For example, coastal habitats can act as
buffer zones to provide flood prevention and protection from
storms.191 The development of these buffer zones can increase
the severity, likelihood, and frequency of flooding and resulting
damages.192
A plaintiff who owns property in a flood plain that was
protected by coastal habitats that were subsequently developed
can allege a loss in flood mitigation benefits that the coastal
habitat provided to their property using an ESV approach.193
The plaintiff can then convert the loss of flood protection into
actual monetary damages.194 An ESV approach thus allows the
plaintiff to allege her injury in the form of a lost pecuniary
interest in the present. This saves the plaintiff from having to
argue that her injury-in-fact is based on an increased risk of
harm occurring—an argument which has not fared well in the
court system.195

action is a vital issue in environmental litigation, where plaintiffs often lack the
pecuniary injury that furnishes standing in most civil litigation.”).
189. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
190. See supra Part I.D.iii.
191. See NAT. CAPITAL PROJECT, INVEST USER GUIDE: COASTAL
VULNERABILITY
MODEL,
http://data.naturalcapitalproject.org/nightlybuild/invest-users-guide/html/coastal_vulnerability.html (last visited Jan. 25,
2019) [hereinafter INVEST: COASTAL VULNERABILITY MODEL] (“Natural
habitats . . . play a vital role in decreasing the impacts of coastal hazards that
can erode shorelines and harm coastal communities.”).
192. INVEST: COASTAL VULNERABILITY MODEL, supra note 192
(“[I]ncreases in anthropogenic pressure can lead to the loss and degradation of
coastal ecosystems and their ability to provide protection for humans during
storms.”).
193. See e.g., id. (providing a model to calculate the lost protection coastal
ecosystem provides following their development or degradation).
194. See id.
195. See Fero v. Excellus Health Plan, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 3d 735, 753 (holding
that increased risk of future identity theft was not an “actual or imminent” or
“concrete” injury).
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Although ESVs can help prove a plaintiff is a lot closer to an
actual or imminent injury, it still has its temporal limits. For
example, certain damages from climate change will not happen
until a hundred or more years from now.196 Attempts to protect
future generations from these harms by linking the degradation
of ecosystems to a loss in carbon sequestration benefits these
future generations will not receive will likely be too much of a
temporal stretch for a court to accept.197
The D.C. Circuit Court highlighted this issue in Wildearth
Guardians v. Salazar.198 Plaintiffs attempted to challenge the
government’s decision to lease public lands for coal mining
operations based on the impact the increased greenhouse gas
emissions (GHGe) would have on climate change.199 However,
the Court found that the plaintiffs failed to prove a demonstrable
increase in risk to their recreational, aesthetic, or economic
interests based on the government’s actions because the harm
would occur sometime in the future and depended “on the
behavior of countless third parties.”200 Therefore, while ESV can
provide a useful tool in many cases to allege standing, it is not
without its own limitations.
b. Concrete Injury
For another illustration that was given by J.B. Ruhl in his
speech at St. Thomas University Law School’s distinguished
speakers series—imagine a plaintiff owns and operates a
commercial apple orchard.201 Next to the apple orchard is a
significant portion of undeveloped land that contains natural

196. Future of Climate Change, U.S. ENVTL PROTECTION AGENCY,
https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/climate-change-science/future-climatechange_.html (last updated Dec. 27, 2016) (explaining the potential impacts of
climate change 100 years from now).
197. Cf. Fero, 236 F. Supp. 3d at 753.
198. 880 F. Supp. 2d 77 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
199. Id. at 79, 84.
200. Id. at 85–86.
201. J.B. Ruhl, Towards of Common Law of Ecosystem Services, 18 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 1, 15 (2008) (explaining how ecosystem services could be used
in nuisance suits: “Lawyers through the ages have had no problem agreeing
that odors from a pigsty, or fumes from a copper smelting plant, or chemical
pollution of a lake or stream are within the ballpark of nuisance so defined. Why
should matters be any different when one person’s use of land severs the flow
of economically valuable ecosystem services to another person’s use of land?”).
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plant species and habitat that supports pollinators like bees.202
If this property is purchased by a developer that plans to turn
the undeveloped land into a residential complex, the apple
orchard could lose incredibly important ecosystem services from
the resulting loss of pollinators.203 Harnessing existing ESV
platforms, the plaintiff’s potential damages can be measured as
a reduction in apple yield and the lost revenue from this reduced
crop yield.204
The Natural Capital Project already has a “pollinator
abundance: crop pollination” model that can be used to measure
reduced crop yields based on the change in pollinator habitat on
its open source platform.205 As the InVEST model user guide
explains:
The InVEST pollination model focuses on wild bees as a key animal
pollinator. It uses estimates of the availability of nest sites and floral
resources within bee flight ranges to derive an index of the abundance
of bees nesting on each cell on a landscape (i.e., pollinator supply). It
then uses floral resources, and bee foraging activity and flight range
information to estimate an index of the abundance of bees visiting each
cell. If desired, the model then calculates a simple index of the
contribution of these bees to agricultural production, based on bee
abundance and crop dependence on pollination. The results can be used
to understand changes in crop pollination and crop yield with changes
in land use and agricultural management practice.206

With a quantified value of lost apple yields, the plaintiff has
proof of an imminent injury that would actually occur as soon as
the defendant develops the property.
Despite the strong private property rights recognized in the
United States, individuals do not have a right to invade the
enjoyment and use of others property.207 With an ESV in hand,

202. Id. (laying out a hypothetical scenario comparing traditional nuisance
suits effecting apple orchards—e.g., emissions damaging the bark of trees from
a neighboring industrial facility—to scenarios, including the one described
above, involving a loss of ecosystem services).
203. Id. See THE NATURAL CAPITAL PROJECT, INVEST USER GUIDE:
POLLINATOR ABUNDANCE: CROP POLLINATION USER GUIDE, INVEST,
http://data.naturalcapitalproject.org/nightly-build/invest-usersguide/html/croppollination.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2019) (“For bees to persist
on a landscape, they need two things: suitable places to nest, and sufficient food
(provided by flowers) near their nesting sites.”) [hereinafter INVEST:
POLLINATOR ABUNDANCE].
204. INVEST: POLLINATOR ABUNDANCE, supra note 204.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. See Nuisance, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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the owner of the apple orchard would be able to bring a nuisance
lawsuit against the defendant alleging a specific injury-in-fact to
their crop yield. Even if the court did not grant an injunction
against the defendant from developing their property, they could
require the defendant to offset the plaintiff’s harm through
compensation.208 If standing had been used by the defendant to
keep the apple orchard owner out of court, she would not have
had a chance to challenge the development through a nuisance
suit in the first place.
c. Particularized Injury
A legitimate limitation to using ESV as a tool to establish
standing may arise when attempting to allege the last element
of the injury-in-fact analysis—a particularized injury. As a
plaintiff gets closer to proving an actual or imminent and
concrete injury based on loses or damages to ecosystem services
it may be harder to prove that said injury is particularized. As
Ori Sharon and her team discussed in their survey of ecosystem
services in common law, “ecosystem services are diffused and, in
most cases, benefit a broad, albeit unspecified, group of
individuals.”209 Plus, as the Supreme Court averred in Friends
of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, it “is not
injury to the environment but injury to the plaintiff” that you
must show.210
This line of reasoning is what prevented the plaintiff in
PEER from establishing standing.211 Mr. Stratford, a member of
the plaintiff organization, submitted a declaration to the court
attesting to the aesthetic, recreational, and cultural values he
gained from Cherokee Lake.212 Mr. Stratford’s concern was that

208. See Walsh v. Town of Stonington Water Pollution Control Auth., 250
Conn. 433 (1999) (granting damages to neighbors of sewage treatment plant for
offensive smell that interfered with their use and enjoyment of the property).
209. Sharon et al., supra note 112, at 13. But see United States v. Students
Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 670 (1973) (accepting
showing of injury and specifically noting that courts should not
deny standing just because many people suffer the same injury).
210. 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000)
211. Pub. Emps. for Envtl. Responsibility v. Schroer, No. 3:14-cv-589-HBG,
2017 WL 943942, at *5 (E.D. Tenn. 2017) (“Mr. Stratford’s Declaration alleges
only a generalized grievance and not an actual, individualized injury.”).
212. Id. (“My family and I enjoy the beauty of Cherokee Lake every single
day, both on and off the water. We frequently boat, fish, entertain, and marvel
at the wonder of the lake.”).
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the defendant’s failure to comply with its wetland permit
requirements would reduce the ecosystem services the wetland
provided to Cherokee Lake and interfere with his “aesthetic,
recreational, and wildlife preservation interest in [the] river
system.”213 However, the Court’s real concern was that the
plaintiff failed to link the loss in ecosystem services to any
individualized injury in his declaration.214 “As the Defendant
noted, Mr. Stratford has not explained how he has been injured
or impacted by the wetland mitigation area.”215
By applying an ESV approach to standing, Mr. Stratford
could have alleged with specific detail in his declaration, and
with supporting evidence, his particularized aesthetic,
recreational, and wildlife preservation interests in the river
system that would be affected by defendant’s failure to comply
with the wetland permit requirements.216 For instance,
Delaware applied the InVEST model to measure the effect of the
states predicted future wetland loss on habitat quality and
rarity in Delaware.217 A similar valuation technique could have
been used to link the defendant’s degradation of the wetland in
PEER to a quantified loss in habitat and species diversity. From
here, counsel would merely have to link this quantified loss of
wildlife to Mr. Stratford’s particularized interest in observing
wildlife on Cherokee Lake.
This analytical approach would likely have assuaged the
Court’s concerns that there was no connection between the
213. Id.
214. Id. (“Mr. Stratford explains how he utilizes the lake, both for
recreational use and aesthetic value, but does not explain how the failure to
mitigate the wetlands affects his recreational use or aesthetic value.”).
215. Id. at *6.
216. See Wetland Ecosystem Services, RAMSAR CONVENTION ON WETLANDS
(Aug. 15, 2011), http://archive.ramsar.org/cda/en/ramsar-pubs-info-ecosystemservices/main/ramsar/1-30-103%5E24258_4000_0 (listing ten ecosystem
services wetlands provide: flood control, groundwater replenishment, shoreline
stabilization & storm protection, sediment & nutrient retention and export,
water purification, reservoirs of biodiversity, wetland products, cultural values,
recreation & tourism, climate change mitigation and adaptation.).
217. See INDUS. ECON., INC., ECONOMIC VALUATION OF WETLAND
ECOSYSTEM
SERVICES
IN
DELAWARE
5-1
(2011),
http://www.dnrec.delaware.gov/Admin/DelawareWetlands/Documents/Econom
ic%20Evaluation%20of%20Wetland%20Ecosystem%20Services%20in%20Dela
ware.pdf (“[C]onversion of wetland to a non-habitat land may result in “edge
effects” on neighboring habitats. That is, where wetlands are replaced by land
uses that fragment or pollute neighboring habitats, broader habitat degradation
may occur across the landscape.”).
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defendant’s failure to mitigate the wetland degradation and Mr.
Stratford’s particularized interest in Cherokee Lake. While
everyone would have suffered from the lost ecosystem services
that the wetland provided, by performing an ESV Mr. Stratford’s
counsel would have been able to show the court the particular
ecosystem services that Mr. Stratford had an interest in based
on his recreational and aesthetic use of Cherokee Lake. PEER
also shows the importance of applying ESV up front in the
pleading stage as plaintiffs attempt to assert specific concrete
and particularized injuries in its brief was too little too late for
the Court.218
However, there will still likely be environmental harms that
are so diffuse and do not affect one individual person enough to
rise to the level of an actual injury-in-fact with or without ESVs.
Lawsuits arising from climate change damages may provide an
example based on the diffuse nature of GHGe.219 While some
individuals may be able to claim a specific injury from climate
change in the future (e.g. beachfront property owners who will
lose land due to rising sea levels),220 for many a cognizable
“injury-in-fact” will remain allusive.
For example, in Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S.
Department of Interior the non-profit organization attempted to
challenge DOI’s approval of a five-year program to expand offshore oil and gas leasing near Alaska.221 The plaintiffs
attempted to allege injury from future climate change damages
in the Arctic stemming from the leasing program.222 The Court

218. Pub. Emps. for Envtl. Responsibility, 2017 WL 943942 at *6 (explaining
that a plaintiff “must set forth by affidavit or other evidence specific facts, which
for purposes of the summary judgment motion, will be taken as true.”) (quoting
McKay v. Federspiel, 823 F.3d 862, 867 (6th Cir. 2016)).
219. Cf., e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Watson, No. C 02-4106, 2005
WL2035596, at *1 (N.D. Ca. Aug. 23, 2005) (holding that plaintiffs established
standing to challenge the defendants’ actions which contribute to global
warming and continuing adverse environmental impacts).
220. See, e.g., Wash. Envtl. Council v. Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131, 1141 (9th Cir.
2013) (finding that individual plaintiffs successfully satisfied the first prong of
specific and concrete injuries by showing, for example, how their properties had
been damaged by flooding and how their health had been negatively affected by
climate changes).
221. 563 F.3d 466, 471–72 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
222. Id. at 476 (“Petitioners contend that, absent Interior’s approval of the
Program, the OCS areas at issue would not be subject to environmental impacts
allegedly brought about by climate change associated with the burning of fossil
fuels produced under the Program.”).
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dismissed this claim because the harm to the individual
plaintiffs from climate change was not more personal to them
than the rest of the world’s population.223 In the future, models
may become accurate and valuation methods advanced enough
that an individual’s damages from climate change can be linked
to specific GHGe. Until that point, individuals may have to rely
on states and cities to vindicate their collective damages from
climate change.224
ii. Application of ESVs can address limitations found in three
commonly proposed environmental standing theories.
Each of the prior environmental standing proposals
discussed in this Note—traditional standing theory, ecosystem
nexus theory, and the intrinsic value of nature theory—has its
merits.225 However, each theory also has limitations that have
prevented its application across the broad spectrum of
environmental harms that occur.226 Through proper
applications, environmental lawyers can use ESVs as a tool to
help overcome the limitations courts have found with each of
these common proposals. By tweaking the way an injury is
alleged, and using tested analytical methodologies, ESVs can
help prove that a plaintiff has indeed suffered an injury-in-fact
while still relying on the underlying theory of each proposal.
a. Traditional Standing Theory
As discussed supra one limitation under the traditional
standing theory is the inability of public interest organizations
to find the “right member plaintiff” for harm impacting remote,
rare, or unpopular environmental resources or species.227 If a
potential defendant is harming the environment, courts will be
223. Id. at 478 (“[C]limate change is a harm that is shared by humanity at
large, and the redress that Petitioners seek—to prevent an increase in global
temperature—is not focused any more on these petitioners than it is on the
remainder of the world’s population.”).
224. See Umair Irfan, Pay Attention to the Growing Wave of Climate Change
Lawsuits,
VOX
(Feb.
22,
2019),
https://www.vox.com/energy-andenvironment/2019/2/22/17140166/climate-change-lawsuit-exxon-julianaliability-kids (providing background on a rise in climate change lawsuits filed
by states and cities against oil and gas companies for current and future
damages related to climate change).
225. See supra Part I.C.
226. See supra Part II.A.
227. See supra Part II.A.i.
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of no service in stopping the damages unless a plaintiff is
identified whose interests in some way are directly injured by
the environmental harm.228 However, from an ethical approach,
environmental resources should not be saved from degradation
only if they are popular, well-studied, or in the general public’s
eyesight.229 Applying an ESV methodology to standing, plaintiffs
will be able to bridge the gap between a harm to a remote area
or species and an injury-in-fact suffered by the plaintiff.
Looking to Lujan, Defenders of Wildlife were unable to
identify a plaintiff whom the court found sufficiently injured
from the government’s funding of international dam projects,
despite two plaintiffs’ testimony that they had visited and
observed endangered species potentially impacted from the
projects and had future (albeit not concrete) plans to return.230
Applying an ESV model, potential plaintiffs could measure the
projected impacts on ecosystem services from the construction of
the Aswan and Mahewali Dams and demonstrate the negative
effects the dams would have on their interests by charting,
measuring, and illustrating the resulting ripple effects across
the relevant ecosystem. For instance, one ecosystem services
assessment of a proposed dam in the Mekong showed that “[f]ull
development of proposed hydropower dams will further reduce
sediment supply to less than 10% of the natural rate.”231
Sediment provides vital ecosystem services including the
prevention of delta erosion where over half of Vietnam’s
agriculture is grown.232 By identifying and broadening the scope

228. See, e.g., Pub. Emps. for Envtl. Responsibility v. Schroer, No. 3:14-cv589-HBG, 2017 WL 943942, at *5 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 9, 2017) (citing Friends of
the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000)) (explaining
the injury requirement environmental plaintiffs must demonstrate to establish
standing to sue).
229. See LEOPOLD, supra note 95, at 262 (“A thing is right when it tends to
preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong
when it tends otherwise.”).
230. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562–67 (1992).
231. Jeff Opperman, Gaining Power but Losing Ground? Balancing
Hydropower and Sand Supply on the Irrawaddy, FORBES (Mar. 7, 2018),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffopperman/2018/03/07/gaining-power-butlosing-ground-balancing-hydropower-and-sand-supply-on-theirrawaddy/#193851503dd3.
232. Id. (“The Mekong Delta is home to 17 million people and supports
phenomenally productive agriculture that grows half of Vietnam’s staple crops
and 90% of its rice exports. Overall, the Delta underpins more than a quarter
of Vietnam’s GDP.”).
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of the potential damages to ecosystem services that could arise
from a hydropower project—like the Aswan, Mahewali, or
Mekong River Dams—and then calculating the financial value
of these lost services, the potential pool of plaintiffs with an
injury-in-fact grows considerably.
However, there will be some aspects of nature or species
that do not provide any benefits to humans in the form of
ecosystem services.233 There are also species that live in entirely
closed off ecosystems.234 For these resources, it will be impossible
to utilize ESVs to find a plaintiff that is sufficiently injured.
Arguably, this does not mean that these species or isolated
ecosystems are not worth protecting. However, the court doors
will remain closed to any case attempting to protect these species
or ecosystems for lack of an injury-in-fact under the traditional
standing theory using current ESVs.
b. Ecosystem Nexus
Incorporation of ESVs as a tool in standing analyses would
similarly have helped address the flaws in plaintiffs’ ecosystem
nexus theory of standing alleged in Lujan. Defenders of Wildlife
argued that any person who uses any part of a “contiguous
ecosystem” adversely affected by a defendant’s acts or omissions
has standing even if the activity is located some distance away
from the tracts used by the injured person.235 While the plaintiffs
underlying theory was correct from an ecological standpoint—
DOI’s funding of the Aswan and Mahewali Dams would likely
have had adverse and widespread ramifications on the
ecosystem as a whole and impacted persons who used or derived
benefits from portions of that ecosystem—what was missing for
233. See, e.g., Jonathan E. M. Baillie & Ellen R. Butcher, Species at a
Tipping Point, in PRICELESS OR WORTHLESS? THE WORLD’S MOST THREATENED
SPECIES 24–87 (2012) (providing examples of endangered species that offer no
benefits to humans).
234. For example, the Movile Cave in Romania was sealed off from the
outside world for 5.5 million years until 1986 when it was discovered. It is full
of poisonous gasses yet forty-nine different species have been found in the cave.
It is closed off by the Romanian government because of its danger and only 100
people have been allowed inside. See Jasmin Fox Skelly, The Bizarre Beasts
Living
in
Romania’s
Poison
Cave,
BBC
(Sept.
4,
2015),
http://www.bbc.com/earth/story/20150904-the-bizarre-beasts-living-inromanias-poison-cave.
235. Brief for the Respondents, Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555
(1992) (No. 90-1424), 1991 WL 577004,
at *27 (Aug. 30, 1991).
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the court was a “nexus” between the adverse effect on the
“contiguous ecosystem” and the harm the plaintiff suffered.236
Applying an ESV standing theory, plaintiffs could establish this
“nexus” and illustrate to the court the exact injury the plaintiff
is suffering.237
Once again, the InVEST platform shows how an ESV
approach could have helped the plaintiffs in Lujan establish
standing. One of InVEST’s models is the habitat quality model
which does not directly monetize biodiversity but instead treats
it as an independent attribute of natural systems that can be
linked to the quality of the habitat.238 The model has a number
of defined threats (based on the potential land use or land cover)
that can be inputted into the assessment to “measure potential
changes in habitat extent, quality, and rarity on a landscape.”239
One of the possible threats that can be mapped in the model is
the impact on habitat from “reservoirs and other running water
diversions,” both of which result from the construction of
dams.240 Other studies have also used ESV methodologies to
determine the impacts of hydropower systems on ecosystem
services including the social and economic impacts from “altered
food-chain dynamics, habitat fragmentation, intrusion of
saltwater, displacement of wetland vegetation by upland

236. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 566 (1992) (citing Lujan v. Nat’l
Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 887–89 (1990) (holding that the ESA does not
extend rights to “persons who use portions of an ecosystem not perceptibly
affected by the unlawful act in question.”).
237. Salzman, supra note 12, at 901 (“As our understanding of
ecological services develops, however, it well may be possible with a degree of
certainty to establish connections between identifiable injuries and specific
harms to services such as pollination or water retention.”).
238. NAT. CAPITAL PROJECT, INVEST USER GUIDE: HABITAT QUALITY
MODEL,
http://data.naturalcapitalproject.org/nightly-build/invest-usersguide/html/habitat_quality.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2019).
239. Id.
240. Id. (listing the number of species currently endangered from the threat
of reservoirs and other water diversions as 161 and the number threatened as
240); see also The Pros and Cons of Dams, ARCADIA POWER,
https://blog.arcadiapower.com/pros-cons-dams/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2019)
(describing how reservoirs and water divisions from hydropower can damage
the environment and highlighting how after the Aswan dam was built—one of
the dams in question in Lujan—”scientists noticed a marked decline in fish
production around the area, as the amount of nutrients and food was now less
than before the dam.”).
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species, disrupted reproductive patterns for fish and wildlife
species, and loss of coastal mangroves.”241
If these valuation tools had been available at the time of
Lujan, Defenders could have established a “nexus” between the
Aswan & Mahewali Dams construction and the adverse impacts
the dams would have on habitat extent and quality in the specific
area of the contiguous ecosystem Kelly and Skilbred used to
observe the Nile Crocodile, Asian elephant, and leopard, even if
the dams were located some distance away.242 This would have
assuaged the majority’s fear that the plaintiffs were alleging
standing based on their use of a portion of an ecosystem “not
perceptibly affected by the unlawful act in question.”243 Back in
1997 Salzman noted there was a potential application for
ecosystem services to establish the nexus Justice Scalia was
looking for in Lujan, stating that an “[i]ncreased understanding
of ecosystem services would . . . justify an ecosystem nexus
theory of standing.”244 Furthermore, instead of broadening the
scope of federal jurisdiction in potential contravention of Article
III and separation of powers principles, the application of an
ESV methodology merely provides evidence that the ecosystem
nexus theory is valid under the current standing doctrine.
c. Intrinsic Value of Nature
Finally, ESVs can help address limitations in the “intrinsic
value of nature” standing theory because this methodology puts
environmental harm into terms courts already understand—
pecuniary or identifiable human interests and monetary
damages.245 Attempts to grant natural objects standing in their
own right often fail because the judiciary is a human construct
created to protect human interests and adjudicate human

241. RICHARD BEILFUSS, INTERNATIONAL RIVERS, A RISKY CLIMATE FOR
SOUTHERN AFRICAN HYDRO, ASSESSING HYDROLOGICAL RISKS AND
CONSEQUENCES FOR ZAMBEZI RIVER BASIC DAMS 33 (2012), https://
hub.globalccsinstitute.com/sites/default/files/publications/162713/riskyclimate-southern-african%20%E2%80%93hydro-hydrological-risksconsequences-zambezi-river-basin-dams.pdf.
242. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 563 (1992).
243. Id. at 566.
244. Salzman, supra note 12, at 902; see id. at 901 (“As our understanding
of ecological services develops, however, it well may be possible with a degree of
certainty to establish connections between identifiable injuries and specific
harms to services such as pollination or water retention.”).
245. See WEINBERG, supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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disputes.246 To address the skepticism U.S. courts have taken
with the “intrinsic value of nature” standing theory, Hockstad
proposed that “litigators should present a more compelling legal
and moral narrative by highlighting human interests at stake in
the preservation of the natural world instead of downplaying
humanity’s relationship to the environment in favor of inflating
the proposed interests of non-human objects.”247 Ecosystem
services are, by their definition, the benefits that the natural
world provides to humans.248 Assessments of these ecosystem
services can help litigators “highlight[] [the] human interests at
stake in the preservation of the natural world.”249 These
assessments, or valuations, can then be used to directly link
damages to the natural world to a human injury in order to
establish standing.
The lawsuit recently filed in federal district court that
attempted to list the Colorado River Ecosystem as a party in its
own right can serve as a use case.250 In the plaintiff’s complaint,
counsel sought declaratory relief from the Court that the
Colorado River was capable of possessing rights similar to a
“person,” that it had certain rights to “exist, flourish, regenerate,
be restored, and naturally evolve,” and that these rights
“establish duties on behalf of the State of Colorado, and all other
governments, to respect those rights.”251 The plaintiffs then
requested the Court to declare that actions taken by the State of
Colorado, including permitting of bulkheads at a gold mine that
led to a toxic spill, overdrawing water, and the operation of dams
violates the rights of the Colorado River Ecosystem.252 Despite
this noble effort, the attorney withdrew the complaint at the

246. See Hockstad, supra note 36, at 121–22 (conceiving “nature as existing
for the purpose of human use and therefore, subservient to humanity’s
interests” and recognizing that the “anthropocentric approach in law [] regarded
nature as a collection of resources for human use and management”).
247. Id. at 127.
248. See Carcamo, supra note 104 (“Ecosystem services are benefits that
ecosystems provide to humans.”).
249. Hockstad, supra note 36, at 127.
250. Complaint at ¶ 4, Colo. River Ecosystem v. Colorado, No. 1:17-cv-02316,
2017 WL 4284548 (D. Colo. Sept. 25, 2017) (“Through this action, the Plaintiffs
are asking this Court to recognize and declare that the Colorado River is capable
of possessing rights similar to a ‘person’ . . . .”).
251. Id. at ¶ 68.
252. Id. at ¶¶ 79, 69, 74, 82, 85(d).
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threat of sanctions from the Colorado Attorney General’s
office.253
Advancing this difficult legal theory was not necessary,
however. The very rights that counsel tried to establish for the
Colorado River Ecosystem (the right to exist, flourish,
regenerate, be restored, and naturally evolve) and the actions he
attempted to hold the State of Colorado liable for all could have
been achieved by applying ESVs as a tool to support counsel’s
standing claims. In fact, Earth Economics published an
expansive and detailed report in 2014 on the value of nature in
the Colorado River Basin.254 The 117-page report studied the
“ecosystem services in the Colorado River Basin” including
“potable water, irrigation water, carbon sequestration, flood risk
reduction, water filtration, wildlife habitat, soil erosion
reduction, soil formation, raw materials, food, recreation, air
quality, and aesthetic value” and calculated “the economic value
provided by these ecosystems.”255 The total value calculated for
the eleven ecosystem services throughout the entire river basin
was $56.5 to $466.6 billion per year, with water supply, and
water quality totaling $7–28 billion alone.256
Within this calculated value of billions of dollars are real
humans who derive these monetary benefits in the form of
ecosystem services from the Colorado River Basin.257 Surely one

253. See Walker, supra note 103 (noting that the Colorado Attorney
General’s Office threatened to impose financial sanctions and the attorney’s
disbarment “on the grounds that his ‘rights of nature’ case is unlawful and
frivolous”).
254. BATKER ET AL., EARTH ECONOMICS, NATURE’S VALUE IN THE COLORADO
RIVER
BASIN
(2014),
https://wrrc.arizona.edu/sites/wrrc.arizona.edu/files/Earth%20Economics%20C
olorado%20River%20Basin%20ESV%20FINAL.pdf.
255. Id. at ii.
256. Id. at 54, 56 (table 28) (totaling the low and high values for water supply
and water quality values inside the 200-foot buffer).
257. See Lily Tomkovic, A Brief History of Water Rights of the Colorado
River, EDUC. AT THE CTR. FOR WATERSHED SCI. (Feb. 14, 2016),
https://watershed.ucdavis.edu/education/classes/ecogeomorphology-grandcanyon-2016/flogs/brief-history-water-rights-colorado-river (“Before settlement
of Anglos in the West, the River provided the lifeblood to numerable indigenous
tribes. Currently, in addition to providing sustenance to indigenous people, the
Colorado River provides water to approximately 36 million people, is the host of
numerous types of recreation-resulting in a revenue of approximately 26 billion
dollars-and generates power through the hydroelectric plants at Glen Canyon
and Hoover Dams.”); Tom Philpott, 40 Million People Depend on the Colorado
River.
Now
It’s
Drying
Up.,
MOTHERJONES (Aug.
4,
2014),
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of these plaintiffs could have brought forward a suit seeking
protection of the Colorado Rivers right to exist and flourish
based on a loss of ecosystem services caused by a defendant’s
actions. Furthermore, in a lawsuit seeking to hold the State of
Colorado liable for its acts and omissions related to mining
permits, dam operation, and excess water allotment a human
plaintiff could have established standing by proving a monetary
diminishment in the value of their recreation, potable water,
irrigation water, aesthetic, or wildlife interests. If counsel for the
Colorado River Ecosystem had used an ESV approach to
establish standing instead of attempting to extend standing to
natural objects based on their “intrinsic value,”258 protection of
the Colorado River Basin likely still could have been achieved
without resulting in a withdrawal of the complaint to avoid
sanctions.259
One limitation that an ESV standing analysis will still
struggle with is harm to cultural and spiritual values found in
nature. For example, to the Ojibwe wild rice is an important
cultural, spiritual, and sacred resource.260 “There is no way to
quantify the value of this food to the Anishinaabeg [Ojibwe]
people—it feeds the belly and the soul, and is a major source of
wealth.”261 Harms to the environment rooted in cultural and

https://www.motherjones.com/food/2014/08/southwests-water-crunch-evenworse-we-thought/ (“[T]he Colorado also provides the irrigation that makes the
desert bloom in California’s Imperial Valley and Arizona’s Yuma County—
source of more than two-thirds of US winter vegetable production.”).
258. Complaint at ¶ 37, Colo. River Ecosystem v. Colorado, No. 1:17-cv02316, 2017 WL 4284548 (D. Colo. Sep. 25, 2017) (imploring the court to
“recognize the inherent worth of the natural communities who give us life”).
259. Athens, supra note 101, at 191 (citing Chris Walker, Attorney to
Withdraw Colorado River Lawsuit Under Threat of Sanctions, WESTWORD (Dec.
4,
2017),
http://www.westword.com/news/colorado-river-lawsuit-to-bewithdrawn-due-to-potential-sanctions-9746311).
260. See Dan Gunderson & Chris Julin, Wild Rice at the Center of a Cultural
Dispute,
MINN.
PUB.
RADIO
(Sept.
24,
2002),
http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/features/200209/22_gundersond_wildric
e-m/ (“‘We consider it to be sacred, because it’s a gift from the creator’, says
White Earth elder Earl Hoaglund. ‘It was foretold in those prophecies that as
the ice melted we were to move westward and food would be provided for us on
the water. And that’s what happened. When we moved into the Wisconsin,
Minnesota areas that rice was already there, growing.’”).
261. Winona LaDuke, The Long and Honorable Battle of the Ojibwe to Keep
Their Wild Rice Wild, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Nov. 2, 2011),
https://newsmaven.io/indiancountrytoday/archive/the-long-and-honorablebattle-of-the-ojibwe-to-keep-their-wild-rice-wild-_dXm7kHqx0-l82Fu2arYLg/.

2019]

ESTABLISHING AN "INJURY-IN-FACT"

485

spiritual value will remain elusive to an ESV approach. It is
important to remember that while ecosystem services and their
valuations are promising tools in an environmental lawyer’s
toolbelt, “not everything that can be counted counts, and not
everything that counts can be counted.”262
CONCLUSION
Standing has proven to be on the most allusive doctrines for
environmental plaintiffs to allege, and a favored defense
strategy of government agencies, private individuals, and
corporate entities. Despite the valid separation of powers
concerns underlying the standing doctrine, federal courts have a
duty to exercise their jurisdictional powers and should not
abdicate their responsibility as a foundational pillar of our
federal government. As Justice Marshall averred “[t]he very
essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every
individual to claim the protection of the laws whenever he
receives an injury.”263
However,
because
of
certain
characteristics
of
environmental harms, including their often diffuse, latent, and
rippling nature, courts have struggled with applying the
standing doctrine when a plaintiff alleges an injury based on
damage to the environment. Without the judiciary’s acceptance
of environmental harm as a valid injury, plaintiffs are relegated
to the political battlefield to seek vindication of their interests
where their voices are often lost to the tides of large corporations
and market forces.
Thankfully, we have arrived at a point in time where
science, data, and robust assessments of ecosystem services can
help prove to courts that plaintiffs bringing lawsuits for
environmental wrongs really have suffered an injury-in-fact.
Ecosystem services provide a useful framework for alleging an
injury under the standing doctrine because they identify the
benefits, and thus the interests, that humans receive from the
natural world. Application of proven models and valuation
techniques can place a monetary value on these services.
Alternatively, ecosystem service assessments can provide proof
of the “nexus” between the environmental harm and damages to
262. WILLIAM BRUCE CAMERON, INFORMAL SOCIOLOGY: A CASUAL
INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGICAL THINKING 13 (1967).
263. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803).
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plaintiff’s particularized interest. The use and applications for
ecosystem services and their valuation have grown considerably;
it is high time environmental lawyers look to ESV as a promising
tool for their standing battles as well.

